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THE CONTRACTUAL FAMILY: THE ROLE OF THE
MARKET IN SHAPING FAMILY FORMATIONS AND
RIGHTS
Deborah Zalesnet

Even with federal recognition of marriage equality and the increasing
number of states that allow same-sex marriage,marriageis not available or
not desirable to everyone. Yet marriage remains a prerequisite to many
legal protections. Despite the popularity and prevalence of alternative
reproductive technologies (ART) as a means of having a child when natural
childbirth is not feasible, biology similarly remains a prerequisite to many
legal protections and rights over one's children. Within this paradigm, the
ever-growing number of families and couples not fitting the traditional
mold are forced to search other areas of the law, such as contract law, for
legal protections. By utilizing contract law, modern families should be able
to achieve the protections that are currently awarded to "traditional"
families by law upon marriageand through biology.
Non-traditionalfamilies in the United States are more commonplace
than ever before and the numbers continue to increase exponentially based
on census data over the last 50 years. Yet despite this growth, alternative
family forms are still marginalizedeconomically, politically,and socially, as
the creation offamily law and policy is still widely governed by traditional
family ideologies. This Article discusses how non-traditionalfamilies can
utilize contract law to create and protect theirfamilies, as well as to obtain
many of the rights and benefits automaticallyconferred upon their married
and biological counterparts. Specifically, the Article looks at the law
surrounding cohabitation agreements and co-parenting agreements.
Although these types of agreements are between private parties and do not
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require third-partyconsent, these agreements continue to be unenforceable
in some states and in some cases.
Cohabitationagreements should be recognized as a valid and necessary
alternative to marriage. Freedom of contract and the right to privacy
should prevent the State from restricting the ability offamilies to structure
their own private relationships.Marriageis, in effect, a choice to be bound
to a status relationshipthat,for some couples, is undesirable because of the
traditional norms and trappings of the marital institution, the heteronormative implications, and the general government control over family.
Also, state-provided rights and responsibilities do not fit all 'family" types.
People in non-marital unions often seek to order their affairs in ways that
are not possible under state-based options. Contracts,at least written ones,
can serve the same evidentiaryfunction that marriagedoes. Both marriage
andformal contractsare ways of showing intent to be legally bound.
Similarly, co-parenting agreements should be recognized as a necessary
way to harmonize the rights of legal (biological or adoptive) and non-legal
(non-biological and non-adoptive) intended parents. Co-parenting
agreements can co-exist with family law's best interest of the child standard.
This Article proposes that an otherwise valid co-parenting agreement
between intended parents supplies the presumption that biological parents
automaticallyget through their genetic connection to their children-the
presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be raised by her
intended parents. From there, custody determinations would still be made
based on the best interest of the child, as with custody determinations
involving biological parents where a contract exists, but with the
understanding that the intended parent, whose intent is expressed and
validated through contract, is the presumed best parent.
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INTRODUCTION

Non-traditional

families

in

the

United

States

are

more

commonplace than ever and the numbers continue to increase
exponentially based on census data over the last fifty years. Yet despite
this growth, alternative family forms are still marginalized economically,
politically, and socially, as the creation of family law and policy is still
widely governed by traditional family ideologies.' Of course,
presumptions about family, and particularly motherhood, are deeply
rooted in our collective psyche. While law has helped define the
boundaries of the American family, the law has moved at a pace that has
failed to keep up with cultural realities.
Even with federal recognition of marriage equality2 and the
increasing number of states that allow same-sex marriage, marriage is
not available or desirable to everyone, yet remains a prerequisite to
many legal protections. And even with the popularity and prevalence of
alternative reproductive technologies (ART) as a means of having a
child when natural childbirth is not feasible, biology remains a
prerequisite to many legal protections and rights over one's children.
Many laws that regulate marriage, adoptions, and parental and
children's rights still fail to recognize the rights of same-sex couples,
non-married heterosexual partners, single parents, children born
1 Jason M. Merrill, Note, Two Steps Behind: The Law's Struggle to Keep Pace with the
ChangingDynamics of the American Family, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 509, 510-11 (2009).
2 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (striking down the federal
government's definition of marriage as union of one man and one woman under the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA)).
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through alternative methods, and caretakers who do not fit into the
traditional family model. Within this paradigm, the ever-growing
number of families and couples not fitting the traditional mold are
forced to search other areas of the law, such as contract law, for legal
protections. By utilizing contract law, modern families should be able to
achieve the protections that are currently awarded to "traditional"
families by law upon marriage and through biology.
However, when parties attempt to define the contours of their
families and secure rights through contract, they are often met with legal
hostility. Despite the fact that their contracts are between private parties
who have given full consent, such contracts continue to be either
unevenly enforced or unenforceable altogether. Courts do not enforce
family contracts in the same ways they enforce contracts outside the
family context, as principles of freedom of contract are not applied in
the same ways and to the same degree in the family context.
These differences stem from the fact that family law and contract
law generally see themselves as having different goals. While the central
idea of family law is to protect families-that is, to reinforce and protect
marriage, and to protect children-the central idea of contract law is to
protect the autonomy of contracting parties and the marketplace
generally. When these two principles and goals come up against each
other, family law inevitably wins--indeed, how can market rights ever
successfully compete against the rights of children? This Article
suggests, however, that the clash between family law and contract law is
falsely described as a battle between protecting the social interests in
children and families against protecting the private interests of
individuals seeking to further their individual rights.
I propose two more logical and accurate ways to reframe the
question. First, the goals of contract and family law are not always in
conflict. The clash can more aptly be seen as one between protecting
traditional versus modern views of family. If we view contract law as a
means of expanding the notion of family and protecting the interests of
parties who are unable to (or choose not to) create their families the
traditional way, then instead of being at odds with family law, contract
law becomes an avenue for reinforcing and advancing the goal of family
law to protect family relationships. Contracts can empower vulnerable
groups and provide procreating liberty to individuals. Further, contracts
between intimate partners can foster each partner's independence,
particularly when the relationship is untraditional and falls outside the
heterosexual marriage structure. Also, allowing intended parents to
secure their rights to their intended children through contract is, in
most cases, best for the intended children as well, who, oftentimes, have
already begun to be raised by these intended parents.
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The second way in which the issue can be reframed is by holding
up family contracts against commercial contracts, rather than against
family law ideology. The dominant bargain theory of contracts
privileges commercial promises over family promises. The law has long
refused and continues to refuse to enforce many agreements in the
family context. Often unenforceable are agreements between spouses
because of pre-existing duty and lack of consideration (both domestic
work and sex are generally considered marital obligations); their
similarity to "meretricious" agreements (agreements governing nonmarital sexual relationships), which tend to be viewed as against public
policy; and their possible inclusion of agreements regarding parental
rights, where monetary exchanges are often "resented" and
"conventionally deplored"3 because they offend the dignity of the
parent-child relationship. When courts fail to give the same legal weight
to promises in intimate settings, it signals the lack of importance of such
promises.
In a legal sense, this suggests that courts consider family as less
important than commerce when it comes to keeping your word. Where
the law privileges rational arms-length market promises, family and
women's issues are relegated to a secondary status. Family promises are
at best enforceable only under the alternate "softer" theory of
promissory estoppel, further elevating the importance of the "harder"
rules of the bargain principle. Why should commercial parties acting at
arms-length receive more legal protection than vulnerable parties in
intimate relationships? Contracts should be a failsafe for these parties
trying to secure rights for themselves. At a minimum, parties to
contracts in the family context should have the same baseline rights that
commercial parties have.
People should be their own lawmakers when it comes to their
personal relationships. Because family and intimate relationships are
highly unique and individual, they often do not fit within the limitations
of government regulations, and may be more functionally structured
through contracts. Families that do not fit the traditional mold should
not have to wait for government approval to attain status equivalent to
their married counterparts, or, in the case of intended parents who are
not biologically related to their intended children, their biological
counterparts. Instead, such partners and intended parents should be
able to secure their rights through private contract. Contracts can better
protect the legal interests of non-married couples and non-legal parents 4

3 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 97
(1983).
4 I use the term "non-legal parents" to refer to parents who are not biologically related to
their children and have not legally adopted them.
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in many cases because contracts affirm autonomy rather than reinforce
government as the arbiter of what "family" means.
This Article critiques traditional limitations on private ordering in
family-based areas of private concern, making the argument for the
enforcement of all validly entered private contracts. The argument is not
a new one, but one that requires deeper examination because of
demographic and legal developments. The Article proposes more
expansive family-based areas that are appropriately governed by private
ordering. These proposals are consistent with cultural and legal
momentum, as the significance of biology has lessened, and the
Supreme Court has recognized broader definitions of marriage. This
Article makes the case for such expansion of private contracting by
focusing on two particular types of contracts: cohabitation agreements
and co-parenting agreements. Despite the fact that cohabitation and coparenting agreements are between private parties and do not require
third-party consent, these agreements continue to be unenforceable in
some states and in some cases. 5 The arguments I make for enforcement
in these two problematic areas can be applied to enforcement of other
types of private contracts that similarly do not affect third-party
interests. I have chosen these two types of family-based contracts
because of their inconsistent application in the law. Furthermore, the
issue of child rearing and parental rights is often coupled with the issue
of marriage; oftentimes, rights that flow from marital status and rights
that flow from parental status are intricately connected.6
Part II discusses the extent to which, under current law,
cohabitation agreements can provide marriage benefits to family
formulations that do not meet the traditional requirements of family,
and the extent to which co-parenting agreements can secure custody
rights to non-legal intended parents that their biological counterparts
would get through their genetic connection to their children. This Part
focuses specifically on the inconsistency of current law surrounding
cohabitation agreements and co-parenting agreements.
While co-parenting contracts that structure parental rights and
responsibilities are increasingly enforceable, they are still not

5 I submit that these issues have continued relevance and importance even after the Supreme
Court invalidated DOMA in United States v. Windsor, in part because same-sex marriage is still
unrecognized in many states, but also because these problems reach far beyond just those
concerns facing same-sex couples.
6 See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partnersbut not Parents/ Recognizing Parents but
not Partners:Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 711, 738 (2000) (describing the "intertwining of marriage and parenting" as seen in cases like
Baehr v. Lewin, wherein courts equate same-sex couples with negative parenting); Ruthann
Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709, 712 (2002)
(discussing the ways in which issues of parenting and child rearing are "often coupled with
marriage").
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enforceable in the ways that other contracts are, since the best interest of
the child standard generally trumps the individual desires of the
contracting parties. Cohabitation agreements are enforced with more
frequency than co-parenting agreements, but still with a persistent
inconsistency. Where the parties to a contract are a gay or lesbian
couple, or an unmarried, cohabitating heterosexual couple, moral and
social judgments about sex and sexuality historically influenced the
analysis of the contractual issue at hand, sometimes resulting in a
contract being held to be against public policy.7 While public policy
concerns are less of an issue today, parties continue to face the hurdle of
showing that a contract exists between non-traditional partners (or even
married parties), which, in some states, requires proof of an express,
written, and signed agreement. 8 Courts are otherwise reluctant to
enforce implied agreements, considering marriage the ultimate proof of
intent to be bound.
Part III discusses the burgeoning debate about the complex ethical
and social issues that arise when people try to decide for themselves how
to create and structure their own families through contract. In this Part,
I make the argument for more consistent and rigorous enforcement of
cohabitation and co-parenting agreements, proposing that courts treat
such contracts as equivalent to marriage and biology-a seal for
demonstrating intent to be bound.
Cohabitation agreements should be recognized as a valid and
necessary alternative to marriage. Freedom of contract and the right to
privacy should prevent the State from restricting the ability of families
to structure their own private relationships. Marriage is, in effect, a
choice to be bound to a status relationship that, for some couples, is
undesirable because of the traditional norms and trappings of that
institution, the hetero-normative implications, and the general
government control over family.9 Requiring marriage as a means of
receiving government benefits and protections artificially restricts
private decisions and behavior regarding intimate relations, making
marriage effectively "compulsory." 10 Contracts, at least written ones, can
serve the same evidentiary function that marriage does. Both marriage
and formal contracts are ways of showing intent to be legally bound.
Similarly, co-parenting agreements should be recognized as a
necessary way to harmonize the rights of legal (biological or adoptive)
7 See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
9 Robson, supra note 6 (noting that "marriage implicates serious and insoluble problems of
equality").
10 RUTHANN

ROBSON, FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE

ENCOUNTERS,

UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 313, 324 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009)
(arguing that marriage is a political institution and that the desire or choice to marry should be
"open to question").
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and non-legal (non-biological and non-adoptive) intended parents. Coparenting agreements can co-exist with family law's best interest of the
child standard. I propose that an otherwise valid co-parenting
agreement between intended parents supplies the presumption that
biological parents automatically get through their genetic connection to
their children-the presumption that it is in the best interest of the child
to be raised by her intended parents. From there, custody
determinations would still be made based on the best interests of the
child, as with custody determinations involving biological parents where
a contract exists, but with the understanding that the intended parentwhose intent is expressed and validated through contract-is the
presumed best parent.
I. THE USE AND LIMITATIONS OF CONTRACTS TO PROVIDE NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES WITH BENEFITS AWARDED BY MARRIAGE AND
BIOLOGY

The traditional family is no longer a reality for many Americans.
Today, fewer than a quarter of families consist of married parents and
their biological children, and a majority of U.S. families can now be
considered what historically has been "non-traditional," including
unmarried cohabitating couples," same-sex couples,12 single-parent
households,13 extended-family households,14 as well as older parents. 5
11 The number of non-married heterosexual couples has been increasing rapidly, and the
numbers are predicted to continue escalating. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal

Policy: The Case of Heterosexual Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 34 (2007). While the
increase in unmarried cohabitation is not restricted to any social or economic groups, the trend is
more popular among "lower-income people, African Americans, Latinos (especially Puerto
Ricans), and divorced persons." Id.
12 With growing social acceptance, more and more same-sex couples are openly living
together and starting families. In 2000, same-sex couples comprised 594,000 households. Merrill,
supra note 1, at 510. In 2004, 75,000 or more same-sex couples in the United States were raising
children in their homes. Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to
a Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 90 (2004).
13 Single-parent families are the quickest growing family form in America, tripling since
1960. Single-parent families constitute approximately thirty percent of all families with children
under age eighteen. CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, FAMILY STRUCTURE: INDICATORS ON CHILDREN

AND YOUTH (2014), available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/59FamilyStructure.pdf (highlighting the statistic, but noting that until recently there was no
distinction between single-parent families living with only the single parent, and those living with
a single parent and that parent's partner). Approximately sixty percent of all children will live in a
single-parent home before age eighteen. Karl Zinsmeister, ParentalResponsibility and the Future
of the American Family, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1005, 1005-06 (1992). Additionally, in 2004, onethird of all women giving birth were unmarried. See Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 91. Single-parent
families can be the result of death, divorce, failed relationships, or decisions to conceive, raise, or
adopt a child solo.
14An assumption in the United States is that "'outsiders' are ... peripheral to the family." See
Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 95. However, families with multiple caregivers can form a "family

20151

THE CONTRACTUAL FAMILY

1035

Many couples today are not marrying because the law does not permit
it, 16

or are deciding not to marry, perhaps because marriage is no longer

a prerequisite to sexual intimacy, cohabitation, or parenthood. Similarly,

with the advent of ART providing many artificial methods for people to
have children when it is otherwise impossible or infeasible for them to
do so naturally, many intended parents are not actually biologically
related to their children. Accordingly, married couples with biological
children do not necessarily reflect the traditional family form.
Although alternative families are on the rise, lawmaking bodies are
struggling to keep up. 17 Despite recent strides in the law's recognition of

the rights of same-sex couples,18 same-sex couples continue to be
marginalized in most parts of the country, and opposite-sex
cohabitating couples often get treated as friends or acquaintances.
Similarly, intended parents with no biological connection to their
children often have no legal rights to the custody and care of those
children. Despite the increase in divorce and remarriage rates, as well as
the prevalence of strong familial bonds between stepparents and
stepchildren, the legal status of stepparents is not entirely clear or
consistent. 19 Generally, both society and the law, by default, interpret
the word "family" to mean people connected by marriage, blood, or
adoption. Under this rigidly narrow definition, adults that play
important parenting roles often go unacknowledged if they fall outside
the "immediate family," even if they provide a degree and level of care
that one would normally expect from a parent. 20
network" that may include stepparents, grandparents, and a variety of other caregivers such as
blood relatives, neighbors, or family friends, either as primary or in addition to primary
caregivers. Id. at 84-85. Such extended families often offer children a community of adults that
they can consistently rely on for care and support. Id. at 92.
15 M. Elliott Neal, Note, ProtectingWomen: PreservingAutonomy in the Commodification of
Motherhood, 17 WM. & MARY J.WOMEN &L. 611, 613 (2011).

16 Currently, thirty-six states and Washington D.C. issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Washington. See Marriage Center, HUM. RTs. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/
campaigns/marriage-center (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). California once again allows same-sex
couples to wed following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the Proposition 8 case,
Hollingsworth v. Perry. 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). Additionally, United States v. Windsor struck
down the federal government's definition of marriage as union of one man and one woman under
DOMA. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
17 Merrill, supra note 1, at 511-12.
18 In 2000, Vermont became the first state to grant full benefits of marriage by civil unions to
same-sex couples. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2014). In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of
civil marriage solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex violated the
Massachusetts Constitution. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass.
2003); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695; Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. at 2668.
19 Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to Their Stepchildren, 40
FAM. L.Q. 81, 82 (2006).
20

Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 92.
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This Part considers the various ways in which these alternative
family formations can achieve parity with their married and biological
counterparts through contract. Specifically, this Part examines the
success of legal attempts to define family relationships through private
contracting, focusing on cohabitation and co-parenting agreements. In
these two areas, contracts do not require third-party consent. However,
based generally on the notion that the market is not the appropriate
mechanism for controlling family formations, courts, to varying
degrees, remain hesitant to enforce them.
A.

CohabitationAgreements

There are approximately 1,049 federal laws in the United States
Code that consider marital status as a factor.21 Most of the legal
protections and economic benefits awarded to married couples are not
available to non-married couples through contract. This is primarily
because "non-parties," such as the government and private employers,
are not bound by the privately established terms. 22 On the other hand,
some status-based marital benefits can or should be able to be
contracted for privately. Parties should be able to contract privately for
benefits that involve only the private distribution of property or the
private personal lives of members of a family. However, in many cases,
the historical emphasis on marriage has trumped or limited private
decisionmaking in these areas. Indeed, historically, the law has treated
non-married partners as strangers or third parties. 23 This Section

21 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/OGC-97-16, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT

(1997).
22 Sam Castic, The Irrationalityof a Rational Basis: Denying Benefits to the Children of SameSex Couples, 3 MOD. AM. 3, 6 (2007). Thus, rights regarding tax-filing status and liability, health
care coverage, family or medical leave, bankruptcy, social security, immigration, testimonial and
other marital privileges, or standing for wrongful death claims cannot be conferred through
private contract law. Id.
23 See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating
Maternityfor Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 349 (2002) (explaining that
"[1]ike other third parties, when a lesbian coparent seeks ongoing custody and visitation with the
biological child of her same-sex partner, she is often unsuccessful in overcoming the
constitutional principles of parental autonomy and privacy" (footnote omitted)). For example,
rights of inheritance can typically be achieved through a will; however, a will may not completely
protect the surviving partner if there is a will contest. If a partner in a non-marital relationship is
not included in the will, the survivor has no statutory right to any assets and lacks standing to
contest the will. But even if the partner was included in the will, it may be, and often is, challenged
by the partner's intestate heirs. E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-FactorApproach to Intestate
Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners,81 OR. L. REV. 255, 257 (2002). On the
other hand, spouses are totally protected-even if there is a will that cuts them out of the
inheritance they still get a statutory share. Marital status also plays an important role in
guardianship and hospital visitation. Death benefits, power of attorney, succession rights, and
medical decisionmaking authority can be protected through private contract in some states. Kathy
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specifically addresses the enforceability of cohabitation agreements.
Although the law is rapidly changing, some courts still will not enforce a
contract between unmarried partners on its face because of the primacy
of regulatory law about property distribution and support. These courts
are more likely to consider the contract as one factor in determining
what is an appropriate property distribution upon a break up.
People enter cohabitation agreements to establish a variety of rights
in a relationship, typically those concerning allocation of property,
income, dispute resolution, and medical care. 24 Rights to property and
rights relating to medical decisions are typically granted by law when a
couple marries, but must be contracted for when two partners do not
have the legal imprimatur of the State.
One of the greatest economic and legal benefits afforded to married
couples is equitable division of property upon dissolution of marriage.
Under the theory that spouses' monetary and non-monetary
contributions are of equal importance to the marriage, spouses share an
equitable claim to property and earnings acquired during marriage.25
The equitable division of property guarantees homemakers will be
compensated for non-wage labor that they provided in the course of the
marriage, and recognizes that marriage is a joint venture of "effort,
sacrifice, and mutual support."26 Married couples that divorce are also
entitled to an award of maintenance, while an unmarried couple has no
such protection upon separating.
Traditionally,
contracts
between
non-married,
intimate,
cohabitating partners attempting to secure such benefits upon
dissolution of the relationship were used with limited success. Courts
have historically disfavored private contractual alternatives to marriage,
finding them contrary to public policy regardless of the parties' sexual
orientation.27 The "whore stigma" perpetuates the taboo of non-marital
contracts. Specifically, the whore stigma is not just about loose sexual
behavior, but also about women who articulate a monetary worth to
T. Graham, Same-Sex Unions and Conflicts of Law: When "I Do" May Be Interpreted as "No, You
Didn't!", 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 231, 232-33 (2004). However, many states do not
provide these rights, or if they do, the benefits are extended only to those who register and not to
all non-marital couples. Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 955, 972-75 (2012); Kimberly Menashe Glassman, Note, Balancing the Demands of the
Workplace with the Needs of the Modern Family: Expanding Family and Medical Leave to Protect
Domestic Partners,37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 837, 868-69 (2004).
24 Brooke Oliver, Contractingfor Cohabitation: Adapting the California Statutory Marital
Contract to Life Partnership Agreements Between Lesbian, Gay or Unmarried Heterosexual
Couples, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 899, 913-16 (1993).
25 Shari Motro, Labor, Luck, and Love: Reconsidering the Sanctity of Separate Property, 102
Nw. U. L. REV. 1623, 1624 (2008).
26 Id.
27 2 HOWARD 0. HUNTER & KEITH A. ROWLEY, Cases Rejecting Marvin Approach, in
MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 24:8 (rev. ed. 2011) (citing Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill.
1979)).

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

1038

[Vol. 36:1027

their work and companionship. Although contemporary sexual "moral
hurdles" are lower than in the past, the taboo of women negotiating
their worth is still pervasive. Research shows that women who negotiate
job acceptances or salaries fare worse than their female counterparts
that do not negotiate.28 The taboo of women who display financial
ambition in negotiation could play a significant part in the perception of
non-marital contracts as "illicit."
However, with dramatic changes to societal norms and attitudes
regarding cohabitation over the past half-century have come changing
attitudes toward cohabitation agreements. 2 9 In the past few decades, the
numbers of unmarried cohabitating couples have dramatically risen. In
1960, there were fewer than 500,000 opposite-sex cohabitating couples.30
The total number of cohabitating couples as of 2010 (including both
opposite and same-sex couples) was 7,744,711-more than 15 million
individuals.3' From 2000 to 2010 the number increased by more than
32
2.2 million households, an increase of roughly forty-one percent.
Unmarried, opposite-sex couples living together increased by roughly
forty percent. 33 Meanwhile, over the same decade, the number of
unmarried same-sex couples living together more than doubled, even
with the addition of states legalizing same-sex marriage.34 What at one
time may have been viewed as different, or even deviant, behavior,
cohabitation "is now the normal way to initiate unions."35
As a result of these changing attitudes, cohabitation contracts have
come to be recognized by most courts. 36 Since the landmark 1976
Marvin v. Marvin decision, courts have begun focusing on the
cohabitating parties' agreements instead of the parties' status as
28 See Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Social Incentivesfor Gender Differences in the Propensity to
Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 84, 98-99 (2007).
29 Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42
FAM. L.Q. 309 (2008). Garrison calls it the "Cohabitation Revolution." During the Cohabitation

Revolution, shifting attitudes toward pre-marital sex combined with advances in technology,
including contraceptive devices, resulted in markedly different societal views about traditional
marital living arrangements. Id. at 312-14.
30 Bowman, supra note 11, at 7.
31 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2010, at 5 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf.
32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35 Bowman, supra note 11, at 8 (footnote omitted).
36 See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). Marvin was one of the first cases to
uphold such a contract, finding that "a contract between nonmarital partners is unenforceable
only to the extent that it explicitly rests upon the immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious
sexual services." Id. at 112. The Marvin case began to unravel a long-standing principle that
public policy prevents enforcement of contracts between intimate partners engaged in a sexual
relationship outside of marriage. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY,

GENDER, AND THE LAW

690 (3d ed. 2011).
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cohabitants.37 In Marvin, the court upheld an oral agreement made by
an unmarried, cohabitating couple that, upon dissolution of their
relationship, they would share all property accumulated during the
cohabitation equally.38
However, while post-Marvin contracts between cohabitants are
now often enforceable,39 there are still some states that refuse to enforce
them, and in other states, there are still some hurdles that must be
overcome for enforcement. First, even today, Illinois, Georgia, and
Louisiana still do not recognize cohabitation contracts between either
opposite-sex or same-sex couples.40 In other states, cohabitation
agreements among opposite sex couples may be routinely enforced, but
cases involving same-sex couples are at risk.41 In many states,
cohabitation agreements can give same-sex couples legal protection in
the event of dissolution of their relationship,42 but couples must
carefully draft the contract to ensure the consideration is valid and not
meretricious, and thus void. 43
Arguably, the greatest hurdle to enforcement of cohabitation
agreements is showing that a contract actually exists. Many of the nonenforcement cases stem from the reluctance of some courts to find
intent to be bound in these situations, the same thing that underlies a lot
of the chestnut contracts cases involving family members. In some cases,
the parties only get full contractual rights if they have a formal written
contract with all the bells and whistles, and certain jurisdictions will
only enforce express, signed, and written agreements.*" The implied
contract idea is fraught, and to the extent courts divine them, it looks a

37 2 HOWARD 0. HUNTER & KEITH A. ROWLEY, Developing Recognition of Agreements
Between Unmarried Cohabitants-Watershed Case of Marvin v. Marvin, in MODERN LAW OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 24:5; see also Marvin, 557 P.2d 106.
38 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 115-16.
39 Elizabeth Hodges, Comment, Will You "Contractually" Marry Me?, 23 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 385, 391-92 (2010).
40 Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475, 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d
1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 326 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
41 Historically, cases upholding such contracts did not automatically apply to same-sex
couples. See, e.g., Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981) (refusing to enforce an express
cohabitor's agreement between two men).
42 See generally Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners
andLesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511, 521-29 (1990).
43 See, e.g., Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992). In Crooke, the Georgia Supreme
Court upheld a contract between lesbian partners that included a merger clause in their
cohabitation contract, "that prohibited the court from considering parol evidence relating to the
'illegal and immoral' nature of the relationship." Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade:
Bridging the Private/PrivateDistinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 94 (2001) (footnote
omitted). The court upheld the contract, despite the state's sodomy statute, holding that "even if
parol evidence were permissible, any 'alleged illegal activity was at most incidental to the contract
rather than required by it."' Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Crooke, 414 S.E.2d at 646).
44 Hodges, supra note 39, at 391, 401 ("Intent is the most important part of the contract, [and]
a written agreement allows for the court to clearly determine intent.").
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lot more like government regulation than private ordering
anyway. 45 Ultimately marriage is akin to the ultimate "seal" in terms of
demonstrating intent to be bound.
For example, under Minnesota, Texas, and Michigan law,
cohabitation agreements between opposite sex couples regarding
property and financial interests are only enforced where there is a
signed writing, and where enforcement is sought after the relationship
has ended.46 New York is similarly reluctant to enforce implied
cohabitation agreements because of the difficulty in determining each
party's actual intentions.4 7 For example, in Morone v. Morone, an
opposite-sex couple held themselves out to the community as husband
and wife for over twenty years, had two children together, and allegedly
entered into an oral partnership agreement for plaintiffs furnishing of
domestic services in return for defendant's financial support. 48 The
Morone court held that it was unreasonable to infer a paid agreement
for services where the relationship of the parties "makes it natural that
the services were rendered gratuitously."49 Further, the Morone court
expressed concern that recognizing an implied agreement between the
cohabitating parties would be tantamount to restoring common law
marriage, which has been abolished in New York.50 The court further
held that determination of the true intention of each party in hindsight
runs the risk of "emotion-laden afterthought" and potential fraud.5'
Not only do cohabitation agreements have to be in writing in many
states, but also, the parties typically have to overcome a presumption
that their agreements were based on illicit sex.5 2 To do so, parties
generally must show adequate consideration, such as when one party
renders services that would otherwise be paid for (e.g., housekeeping,
53
companion services, or cooking) in exchange for financial support.
Thus, cohabitation agreements that involve language that does not focus
on the emotional or romantic aspects of the relationship, but instead,
uses language more typically found in business agreements, are more

45

Id. at 392.

ANN § 513.075 (West 2012). This statute uses the language "man and woman"
and has not been successfully challenged on equal protection grounds. See Rodlund v. Gibson,
No. A06-2255, 2008 WL 73548, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2008); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 1.108 (West 2011).
47 Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154,1157 (N.Y. 1980).
48 Id. at 1155.
49 Id. at 1157 (citations omitted).
50 Id. at 1157-58.
51 Id. at 1157.
52 2 HOWARD 0. HUNTER & KEITH A. ROWLEY, Common-Law Rule: Agreements Void and
46 MINN. STAT.

Unenforceable,in MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 24:2.
53 Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatoryfor Sexual Marginorities:Not Heaven, But Not
Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107, 1137-38 (1996).
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likely to be enforceable.54 For example, if the cohabitation agreement
focuses on business-related services furnished by one partner in
exchange for financial support by the other partner, it is more likely to
be upheld than if the agreement focused on a promise to provide love
and companionship in exchange for financial support. 55
This economic bargain analysis is often difficult for cohabiting
couples to satisfy because cohabiting couples, especially those of the
same sex, are less gender-orientated and more likely to equally divide
household tasks than married couples.56 Of course, gender roles within
the marriage are also less rigid than they once were. 57 Additionally, such
lines of inquiry are often invasive of privacy because parties are typically
required to expose intimate details in order to prove the existence of an
implied contract or its nature. In the bigger picture, women in equitable
households are less likely to be recognized as being in a socially viable
relationship worth legal protections. The "standards" to be met have
conservative undercurrents, including who "needs" or is "worth" the
court's protection and what kind of relationships are "real" (a trope that
has also discouraged immigrants from forming legally recognized
partnerships).
In effect, another limitation to the enforcement of cohabitation
agreements is that the parties thereto generally cannot be married.
While unmarried cohabiting couples can get away with framing their
relationship as an economic one, married couples usually cannot.
Where married people provide services for each other, there is a wellestablished presumption that the services are provided gratuitously and,
therefore, such contracts between spouses are often not enforceable.5s
The unwillingness of many courts to enforce inter-spousal contracts can
be explained by the need to maintain the separation between economic
exchange and intimacy. This "anti-commodification" position is
another way in which courts seek to protect intimate relations from the
market, which, some believe, could undermine the dignity of marriage,

54 Id. at 1137; Robson & Valentine, supra note 42, at 541 ("[W]hile contracts may... benefit
individual lesbians, the origins and assumptions of contract ideology render relationship
contracts questionable.").
55 Ertman, supra note 53, at 1138.
56 Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 27 (2010); Bowman,
supra note 11, at 35.
57 Bowman, supra note 11, at 35.
58 Miller v. Miller, 35 N.W. 464, 464 (1887) (refusing to enforce a husband's promise to pay
his wife for housework and other domestic duties, holding that there was no consideration
because the wife already owed those duties to her husband-"the plaintiff merely agreed to do
what by law she was bound to do"); Brooks v. Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Wis. 1980) (stating
"[w]here there is a close family or marriage relationship, the law presumes the services are
performed gratuitously, and the law will not imply from the mere rendition of services by one
family member to another a promise to pay").
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"denigrate[] the emotional significance of home labor,"59 and "violate
the norms of love that are supposed to govern marital relations."60 As a
result, one unintended consequence of such rules seems to be that
courts may uphold economic arrangements among unmarried
cohabitating partners where the same arrangement between married
couples would not be upheld. 61
While the cases reward unmarried cohabitants, giving household
work a monetary value, they implicitly foreclose the possibility of stayat-home spouses-usually wives-from receiving compensation for
similar household work, reinforcing the belief that such services are part
of the presumed gratuitous duties of a marital relationship. The
presumption undervalues the labor associated with the marital
relationship, when courts are less willing to enforce promises in that
arena.
At the same time, the rules require courts to treat same-sex couples
or other unmarried couples in a committed intimate relationship as
friends or co-workers in order to justify enforcement of a contract
between them. Characterizing the relationship as simply a contractual
one-without acknowledging any sexual and personal relationship
between the parties-reflects the discomfort of some courts with
addressing sexuality. Also, with parameters that distinguish married
couples from unmarried couples, the presumption fails to recognize the
value of love and commitment between unmarried couples. Unmarried
couples should not have to downplay or ignore their intimate
relationship to have their contracts enforced.
When the court does actually acknowledge the sexuality or sexual
relationship of unmarried parties, such acknowledgment may pose an
additional hurdle for the enforcement of a contract between two people
59 Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 81, 95 (1997).
60 Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 500 (2005).
But this argument for the regulation of economic exchanges in the household reinforces the
gendered nature of home labor and disproportionately harms poorer people and usually poor
women. Failure to enforce inter-spousal contracts undervalues the labor associated with the
marital relationship.
61 CompareMiller, 35 N.W. at 464 (refusing to enforce a husband's promise to pay his wife for
housework and other domestic duties based on lack of consideration) with Brooks, 290 N.W.2d
697 (finding that a contract implied in fact existed between two people who were in a sexual
relationship and who lived together, but who were married to other people, for the household
chores and services one provided to the other before his death), and Van Brunt v. Rauschenberg,
799 F. Supp. 1467, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (enforcing an oral contract between an unmarried samesex couple, wherein one partner promised to "devote his life, both personally and professionally"
to the other-a well-known artist with whom he had a twenty-two-year relationship but to whom
he was not married-in return for the second partner's payment of his taxes and copies of artwork
produced). In upholding the contract, the Van Brunt court barely mentioned the decades-long
sexual relationship between Van Brunt and Rauschenberg, instead saying, "[t]his is not a case
involving an illicit sexual relationship. Nor is it a case where the services provided were of the type
usually rendered gratuitously." Id.
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of the same sex because of moral and social judgments about sexuality
and sexual orientation-though these cases have become more and
more rare. For example, in Jones v. Daly,62 the court refused to enforce
an express cohabitation agreement between two men. The gay couple
had an agreement almost identical to one recognized and enforced in
Marvin v. Marvin, a case involving cohabitants of the opposite sex. 63
The court, however, found that the contract in Jones rested upon
meretricious consideration.64 The couple had agreed that during the
time they lived and cohabited together, they would hold themselves out
to the public at large as "cohabitating mates" and one partner, Jones,
would abandon his career so that he could render his services to the
other, Daly, as "a lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion,
housekeeper and cook."65 The court found that because Jones "allowed
himself to be known to the general public as the 'lover and cohabitation
mate' of Daly," one could conclude that Jones's "rendition of sexual
services to Daly was an inseparable part of the consideration for the
'cohabitors
agreement,'
and indeed was the predominant
consideration."66 The court determined that the terms "lover" and
"cohabitation mate" in the context of the cohabitation agreement
between Daly and Jones are not innocuous, but instead, "can pertain
only to [Jones's] rendition of sexual services to Daly."67 This is because,
the court reasoned, "lover" can have many meanings; "while one
meaning of the word 'lover' is paramour, it also may mean a person in
love or an affectionate or benevolent friend."68
The number of unmarried same-sex and opposite-sex cohabiting
couples has dramatically risen over the last fifty years and the growth in
these types of living arrangements does not appear to be slowing down
anytime soon. Although more common today than ever, cohabitants
cannot be sure of their rights, which may depend on where they live and
the exact contours of their contracts. While the recent trend favors
enforcement of both express and implied cohabitation agreements,
some states will only enforce specific written agreements, and a few
remaining states will not enforce any form of cohabitation agreement.
Ultimately, putting agreements in writing, and thus showing each
parties' intent to be bound by the terms of the agreement, provides the
best protection to unmarried cohabitating couples.
62 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981).

63 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (finding a cohabitation agreement between
unmarried, opposite-sex cohabitants was enforceable unless it explicitly rested on meretricious
consideration).
64 Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
65 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
66 Id.
67 Id.

68 Id. (citation omitted).
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Co-ParentingAgreements

There are a variety of scenarios under which a party might be
seeking to uphold a co-parenting agreement. Parenting contracts can be
made pre-conception or post-break up, and they can be express or
implied. These contracts can exist between same- or opposite-sex
cohabitating, or married couples, or between two people who are not a
couple at all. In some cases the two parents conceive the child with the
intent to be co-parents from the beginning, while in other cases, one
parent might have had the child before the second caregiver gets
involved.69 In addition, some contracts may involve more than two
parties.70 Finally, plaintiffs in lawsuits involving parenting contracts may
be in pursuit of custody, visitation, or economic support from a nonlegal parent.
This Section examines the extent to which contracts are likely to be
enforceable in each of these circumstances. As with cohabitation
agreements, courts do not agree on the legality of co-parenting
agreements. But the trend, as compared to cohabitation agreements, tilts
more strongly toward non-enforcement. Generally, when courts are
willing to consider parenting agreements, they tend to be more willing
to impose financial obligations on non-legal co-parents than they are to
award non-legal co-parents custody or visitation. This is especially true
where the non-legal parent is the same sex as the biological parent.
Paradoxically, express co-parenting agreements between parties of the
same sex are often found unenforceable for policy reasons surrounding
fitness to parent, while implied contracts are often enforced to prevent a
same-sex partner from avoiding financial responsibility for a child.
Because family law demands that custody determinations be made
according to the best interest of the child, private contracts seeking to
establish custody arrangements have historically been disfavored, with
the leanest protection for private contracts where a non-legal, same-sex
parent seeks custody of a child.71 Various presumptions in favor of
biological parents affect the best interest of the child analysis, leaving
non-legal parents more vulnerable. Heterosexual couples, wherein both
the woman and man are biologically related to their children,
automatically enjoy a constitutional right to the care and custody of

69 See, e.g., Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 988 (Alaska 1989) (involving a contract with a
person "who has a significant connection with the child"); In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah
1990) (involving a parenting contract with a stepparent).
70 See generally Melanie B. Jacobs, More Parents, More Money: Reflections on the Financial
Implications of Multiple Parentage,16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 217,218 (2010).
71 Katherine M. Swift, ParentingAgreements, The Potential Power of Contract,and the Limits
of Family Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 913,915-16 (2007).
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their children.72 This is true even where the parents are not married.73
Further, children born within marriage are presumed to be a product of
that marriage even if the child is not the biological child of one of the
parents, 74 whereas unmarried couples, domestic partners, or couples
who are not both "natural" parents do not benefit from this
presumption.75 Where there is a constitutional right to care and custody
of a child, the presumption is that it is in the best interest of the child for
such "parents" to raise and care for their children, without regard to
other factors. Where there is no constitutional right to care and custody
of the child, the best interest of the child analysis demands more
rigorous consideration of a variety of factors.
In the traditional model, a man and woman fall in love, get
married, make a plan to have children, prepare a secure home in which
their children will be safe, supported, and loved, and proceed as best
they can with this plan. If this couple does not separate, and the man
and woman are not found to be unfit parents (i.e., through abuse or
neglect), they can raise their child as they choose, and they need not
contract for any rights related to their child.76 If they are both fit
parents, even if they separate, they will both have a right to visitation
and/or custody of their children. 77

72 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (noting that "[tihe liberty interest at issue in this
case-the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court").
73 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753
(1982) (discussing "[tihe fundamental liberty interest of naturalparents in the care, custody, and
management of their child" (emphasis added)).
74 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding conclusive presumption that a
child born into marriage is the legal child of the mother's husband).
75 States vary on whether the due process rights of the biological parent prevent the nonbiological parent's pursuit of custody or visitation. Compare Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d
27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that former lesbian partner lacked standing as either de facto parent
or parent by estoppel to seek visitation of a child she helped raise for two years because she was
neither biological nor adoptive parent), with In Re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 163 (Wash.
2005) (en banc) (holding that Washington's common law recognized former partner's de facto
parentage claim and granted standing to petition for a determination of rights of legal parentage).
76 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that "[iut is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder"
(citation omitted)); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (establishing the right of
parents "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control" and stating that
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing the right of parents to
"establish a home and bring up children" as well as to control their children's education).
77 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (holding that due process entitles parents to
a hearing on their fitness as parents before their children are taken from them). But see Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (holding that an unwed father who never sought custody or a
relationship with his natural child did not have a right to object to the child's adoption by the
child's stepfather).
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In partnerships that cannot result in a child who is biologically
related to both parents (i.e., where one or both members of a
heterosexual partnership cannot reproduce, or in a same-sex
partnership), the couple may follow many of the same steps as the first
couple, but these steps will not yield the same rights. For a couple that
has a "non-biological" child, the two parents may fall in love, get
married, make a plan to have children, prepare a secure home in which
their children will be safe, supported, and loved, and the couple may
proceed with this plan as best they can.
However, unlike the first couple, this second couple will produce a
child that is not biologically related to one or both parents. The second
couple may require the donation of an egg, or sperm, or both, and may
also require that a woman outside of the partnership carry the child in
some form of surrogacy arrangement. The members of this second
couple may be no less committed to nurturing and loving their child.
They may be just as thoughtful about their family planning as the first
couple. In fact, they will likely devote more time and resources to family
planning because it requires more complex arrangements and
reproductive technology.
However, depending on the state she lives in, a member of the
second couple who is not biologically related to her child will not have
an automatic right to the care and custody of the resulting child.78
Rather, courts may be forced to look at the relationship of the parties in
order to ascertain to what extent they are responsible for a child.79 Even
in California, for example, which permits a same-sex partner to become
the legal parent of a non-birth, non-genetic child through second-parent
adoption (without terminating the legal status of the original parent),
78 See DeBoer by Darrow v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993) (holding that neither the state

law in question nor federal law "authorizes unrelated persons to retain custody of a child whose
natural parents have not been found to be unfit"); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)
(discussing the fundamental constitutional right of natural parents to the care and custody of
their children and emphasizing this right in the context of "blood relationships"); Windsor v.
dissenting in part and concurring in
United States, 699 F.3d 169, 207 (2d Cir. 2012) (Straub, J.,
part) ("The Court has indicated repeatedly that history and tradition are the source for
supplying... content to th[e] Constitutional concept that biological family units are afforded
additional protections under our nation's laws.") (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion)).
79 In traditional surrogacy agreements where a married woman is genetically unrelated to the
child the marital presumption may not be recognized. See In Re Parentage of a Child, 16 A.3d 386,
397 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). However, with gestational surrogacy agreements, where a
third party gives birth to a child genetically related to the wife and husband, the marital
presumption is more likely to be recognized. E.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 777-78 (Cal.
1993) (finding the gestational surrogate had no legal rights to the child); cf. Doe v. Attorney
General, 487 N.W.2d 484, 489 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (voiding gestational surrogacy agreement
banned by state statute). See generally James Healy, Comment, Band-Aid Solutions: New York's
Piecemeal Attempt to Address Legal Issues Created by DOMA in Conjunction with Advances in
Surrogacy,31 PACE L.REv. 691,694, 696 (2011).
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the right to care and custody of a "non-genetic" child is not automatic.

Two same-sex parents must affirmatively show that they intended to
parent together, a requirement not asked of two "biological" parents.s0
Since "obvious parenting behaviors" are not always enough to convince
a court that a child has two parents of the same sex, many same-sex coparents rely on private contract law to demonstrate their parental
intent. 81
In some states, if the child is biologically related to someone
outside of the partnership, that person may have equal or even superior
rights to the child.82 It has been noted:
Third parties who have become "psychological" parents are faced
with an obstacle not faced by biological or adoptive parents: they
may be precluded from even petitioning for custody of a child with
whom they have had a parent-child relationship because of the
difficulty of establishing their standing to do so. Standing
requirements were incorporated into child custody law as a means of
maintaining the "superior rights" doctrine, a presumption of long
standing in most states... that unless found in some broad sense
"unfit," a biological or adoptive parent is the best person to raise and
nurture a child.83

80 Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 785-86 (Conn. 2011) (requiring a same-sex domestic
partner of a biologically related father to show intent to parent through proof of a valid

gestational agreement); Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601, 603 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012)
(stating that "[w]hen there is a marriage between same-sex couples, the need for that secondparent adoption to, at the very least, confer legal parentage on the non-biological parent is
eliminated when the child is born of the marriage").
81 Monica K. Miller, How Judges Decide Whether Social Parents Have ParentalRights: A FiveFactorTypology, 49 FAM. CT. REv. 72 (2011).
82 See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253 (N.J. 1988) (refusing to terminate the biological

(surrogate) mother's right to the child although the biological father and his wife had a surrogacy
contract with her); see also LINDA ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1:3
(2012). Even where a child is born within a heterosexual marriage, but is not the husband's child
(i.e., the child is the result of an extra-marital affair), courts will look at public policy and the
child's best interests to determine which man is the legal father. See, e.g., Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92
Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 313 (Ct. App. 2000) (denying wife's motion for summary judgment in an action
by biological father to establish a parent-child relationship with child born within the wife's
marriage to another man); Boone v. Ballinger, 228 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (allowing
biological father to petition for custody or visitation of children born within their mother's
marriage to another man, even where biological father potentially waived his superior custodial
right to the children as against the husband); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983)
(noting that "[tihe significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring").
83 Lawrence Schlam, Children "Not in the Physical Custody of One of [Their] Parents:" The
SuperiorRights Doctrine and Third-Party Standing Under the Uniform Marriageand Dissolution
of Marriage Act, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 405, 406-07 (2000) (footnotes omitted); see also Kathy T.
Graham, Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents, and Their Children's Rights as Children,48
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 999, 1012 (2008) (pointing out that "[in [the] rare cases where a natural
parent either consents to or is forced to give another person custody rights to his or her child, the
natural parent continues to have legal rights to the child unless parental rights are terminated. In

these situations, the natural parent shares his or her rights with others who have provided care for
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In addition, if one member of the second couple is biologically
related to the child, her rights relating to the child will be superior to her
partner's rights.84
Ultimately, the only way for a non-biological parent (who has not
adopted her intended child) to gain standing to sue for custody is
through contract, and, as with cohabitation agreements, the
enforceability of the contract may hinge on whether it is express or
implied. If the non-biological parent succeeds in gaining standing
through the contract, she must still make an affirmative showing that
custody or visitation will be in the child's best interest before gaining
any custodial rights. Because there is no presumption in favor of the
non-biological parent, the contract becomes, at best, one factor in the
determination of the best interests of the child. Whereas marriage is the
ultimate seal of intent to be bound with respect to rights between
unmarried cohabiting couples, biology is the ultimate seal of intent to be
bound with respect to parenting.
1.

Implied Co-Parenting Agreements for Financial Support

Co-parenting agreements seem most often to be enforced in the
context of a biological parent trying to get financial support from a nonbiological/non-adoptive co-parent. In these cases, typically the court will
find an implied contract for support, even where the parties did not
expressly articulate the terms.8 5 Some courts have used the doctrine of
equitable estoppel in conjunction with an implied contract to hold
parties responsible for paying child support, "not only in the absence of
a biological or adoptive connection to the subject child, but in the
the child. But the natural parent is presumed to have the superior right to care for and have
custody of the child. If the natural parent no longer is willing to share the child with the adult who
has assumed the role of parent, the natural parent is entitled to make that choice"). But see
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119-20 (1991) (holding that a biological father's
constitutional rights were not violated by a state statute creating a conclusive presumption that
children born during marriage were the children of the husband, although not biologically related
to him).
84 Graham, supra note 83, at 1001, 1017. Graham notes that whether in the case of a
heterosexual stepparent or a non-biological parent in a same-sex partnership, the law favors the
.natural" or biological parents:
Not surprisingly, a natural parent who has custody would lose custodial rights only if
proven to be unfit or it is proven that it will be detrimental to the child's interests to
give custody to the natural parent. And even then the noncustodial parent would likely
have rights superior to the rights of the gay or lesbian partner.
Id. at 1017 (footnote omitted). Outside of formal adoption, "the law does not protect the
relationship between the child and the non-birth parent in a same-sex relationship." Id. at 1001.
85 See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); H.M. v. E.T., 906 N.Y.S.2d 85
(App. Div. 2010); Laura WW. v. Peter WW., 856 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div. 2008); In Re Baby Doe,
353 S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1987).
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absence of an established parent-child relationship, where those parties
agreed either to adopt the child or to cause the child's conception
through [artificial insemination by donor (AID)]."86 Courts have
reasoned that if an unmarried person "who biologically causes
conception through sexual relations without the premeditated intent of
birth is legally obligated to support a child, then the equivalent resulting
birth of a child caused by the deliberate conduct of artificial
insemination should receive the same treatment in the eyes of the
law." 87
In the case of opposite-sex couples, equitable estoppel is often
utilized as a preventative measure against supposed fathers who foster a
relationship with the child and later deny paternity in an attempt to
avoid paying child support.88 For example, in Wener v. Wener, the court
held "that a husband could be required, under the 'dual foundation' of
equitable estoppel and implied contract, to support a child whom he
had neither fathered nor adopted."89
The "implied promise-equitable estoppel approach" was recently
applied to a lesbian couple in New York. In Matter of H.M. v. E.T., the
lesbian couple had a child conceived through AID while they were
together.90 After the dissolution of the relationship, H.M., the biological
mother of the child, filed a petition seeking child support from E.T.,
"predicated upon a determination, through the application of the
doctrines of equitable estoppel and implied contract, that E.T. is
chargeable with the support of the subject child, and is not entitled to
disclaim that obligation."91 H.M. asserted that she agreed to conceive the
child through AID, and she allegedly relied upon E.T's promise of
support when she conceived the child.92 The court found in favor of
H.M., stating that:
By parity of reasoning [from Wener], we hold that where the samesex partner of a child's biological mother consciously chooses,
together with the biological mother, to bring that child into the world
through AID, and where the child is conceived in reliance upon the

86 See, e.g., H.M., 906 N.Y.S.2d at 87 (citing Laura WW., 856 N.Y.S.2d 258; Wener v. Wener,
312 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (App. Div. 1970); Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fain. Ct. 1985);
Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1963)).
2003).
87 In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill.
88 See, e.g., H.M., 906 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87.
89 Id. at 87 (citing Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 818). This approach was later sanctioned by the
Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, in In re Baby Boy C., 638 N.E.2d 963, 967-68 (N.Y.
1994).
90 H.M., 906 N.Y.S.2d 85.
91 Id. at 86-87.
92 Id.
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partner's implied promise to support the child, a cause of action for
child support.., has been sufficiently alleged.93
However, even implied parenting contracts for child support are
not always enforced for public policy reasons. For instance, in T.F. v.
B.L, two women lived together for four years and during that time
plaintiff became pregnant through artificial insemination. The couple
then separated and after giving birth to the child, the plaintiff brought a
claim for child support against defendant asserting theories of
promissory estoppel and breach of contract. Despite evidence that an
implied co-parenting contract existed between the child's biological
mother and same-sex partner, and evidence that the co-parent
functioned as a parent, the court held that "parenthood by contract" is
not the law of Massachusetts. Whether implied or express, the
agreement was unenforceable as a matter of "public policy" and thus
defendant had no obligation to pay child support. 94 The court reasoned
that prior agreements about entering into family relationships including
marriage and parenthood are deeply personal matters not for the court's
enforcement.95
Nonetheless, it is not difficult to see why most courts are willing to
imply contracts for support in the types of cases discussed above, in
light of concerns for the best interests of the child. There is little
controversy over the idea that an intended parent should provide
economic support for a child, and that such support will generally be in
the best interests of that child. Co-parenting contracts are much trickier,
however, when the terms go beyond financial support and move into
the realm of visitation and custody.
2.

Express or Implied Co-Parenting Agreements for Custody and
Visitation

Co-parenting agreements for custody are less frequently enforced.
Such contracts have been enforced in a few states, including Ohio,

Id. at 88 (citations omitted).
T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1250-51 (Mass. 2004).
Id. (citing A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000)); see also Wakeman v. Dixon,
921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that sperm donation and co-parenting
agreements between former lesbian partner and biological mother of two children were
unenforceable, despite the partner's support of the children and being the de facto parent);
Sporleder v. Hermes, 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991) (holding in part that plaintiff, a woman seeking
custody and visitation of minor adopted son of former partner of eight years, did not have
standing under loco parentis doctrine and the co-parenting agreement between the parties was
not enforceable with regard to physical custody or visitation rights to the child); Brian H. Bix,
PrivateOrderingand FamilyLaw, 23 J.AM. AcAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 249,273 n.83 (2010).
93
94
95
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North Carolina, and most recently Kansas.96 In these states, a parent's
right to care, custody, and control can be shared by consenting to a coparenting agreement. Courts in these states generally view the biological
parent's consent to the co-parenting agreement as equivalent to the
consent surrounding the creation of de facto parentage or secondparent adoption.97 For example, in Frazierv. Goudschaal,98 two women
had signed a co-parenting agreement in which one of the women would
give birth to two children through use of assisted reproductive
technology and the other woman would be a "de facto parent." The
court upheld the contract, holding that, although the biological mother's
rights were initially paramount, after the biological mother exercised her
"parental preference" by entering into the co-parenting agreement, her
parental preference was waived.99 The court noted that it "should not be
required to assign to a mother any more rights than that mother has
claimed for herself." 100 The court went on to state:
If a parent has a constitutional right to make the decisions regarding
the care, custody, and control of his or her children, free of
government interference, then that parent should have the right to
enter into a coparenting agreement to share custody with another
without having the government interfere by nullifying that
agreement, so long as it is in the best interests of the children. 101
However, courts have generally been reluctant to enforce coparenting agreements that specify custody and visitation arrangements
because of the extent to which they are able to circumvent an analysis of
the best interest of the child.102 To the extent courts are willing to
consider co-parenting agreements for custody, the agreements are
almost never dispositive in granting custody or visitation rights. Rather,
these agreements are only one of many factors in determining the best
interests of the child. For example, in Mason v. Dwinnell,103 the court
held that a non-biological partner had standing to bring a custody

96 See, e.g., Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d
58, 67 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); In re J.D.M., Nos. CA2003-11-113, CA2004-04-035, CA2004-04-040,
2004 WL 2272063 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2004).
97 See Joanna L. Grossman, Parenthoodby Contract: The Kansas Supreme Court Enforces a
Lesbian Co-Parenting Agreement, JUSTIA (Apr. 16, 2013), http://verdict.justia.com/2013/04/16/
parenthood-by-contract.
98 295 P.3d 542.
99 Id. at 556 (citing In re Marriage of Nelson, 125 P.3d 1081, 1086-88 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006)).
1oo Id. at 557.
101 Id. See generally Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Partiesto Seek
Visitation and Custody of Children,47 FAM. L.Q. 1 (2013).
102 See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 32 (N.Y. 1991) (noting that "when there is
a conflict, the best interest of the child has always been regarded as superior to the right of
parental custody" (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976)) (internal quotation
mark omitted)).
103 Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
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action based on an express co-parenting agreement acknowledging the
partner as a de facto parent. However, the court held that the custody
dispute should not be determined solely by the co-parenting agreement,
but rather by the best interests of the child.104 The court found that the
biological legal parent's actions, including the execution of a coparenting agreement, manifested intent to jointly create a family with
her partner and identify her partner as an equal co-parent.105
Although some courts have begun enforcing co-parenting
contracts as described above, non-legal, same-sex co-parents still
generally face "incredible hurdles" and no real legal protection in most
states.106 Some states that view same-sex unions as immoral are hesitant
to enforce a contract that would allow same-sex couples to "opt in to
state recognition of their status as 'co-parents."'107 Some states have
other established methods, such as second-parent adoption, or
legislative solutions that recognize "the validity of a bond between a
same-sex coparent and his/her child," 108 but will not enforce contracts
outside that scope. In such cases, families headed by same-sex co-

104 Id.; see also J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that
mother's former domestic partner had standing to bring partial custody action based on evidence,
including a co-parenting agreement, that former domestic partner and child were co-members of
non-traditional family).
105 Mason, 660 S.E.2d 58; see also In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2002) (upholding a
parenting agreement between two women, one of whom was a biological parent, but still making
the non-biological parent's rights contingent on the best interest of the child). Likewise, in
Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 434-35, 37 (Wis. 1995), where there was no express coparenting agreement, but presumably an implied one, the court determined visitation rights based
on the best interests of the child, not based on the implied agreement. The best interests of the
child, in turn, were determined by the party's past parental function. Id.
106 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217 (N.J. 2006) (noting that "committed same-sex couples
and their children are not afforded the benefits and protections available to similar heterosexual
households"); Joyce Kauffman, ProtectingParentage with Legal Connections, 32 FAM. ADVOC. 24
(2010); Marissa Wiley, Note, Redefining the Legal Family: Protecting the Rights of Coparents and
the Best Interests of Their Children, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 319, 319-20 (2009) (recognizing
numerous ways same-sex couples can protect their family interests, but explaining that "[diespite
the coparents' intent to conceive and raise a child together, and despite long-standing, nurturing,
supporting, and loving parental roles, a same-sex coparent is often a third party in the eyes of the
law" (footnote omitted)).
107 Bix, supra note 95, at 274 n.86 (noting that about forty states "expressly refuse to recognize
same-sex marriage of other jurisdictions, and some of those more broadly refer to other same-sex
relationships" (quoting Matthew J. Eickman, Same-Sex Marriage: DOMA and the States'
Approaches, Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at 1383, 1385 (June 22, 2010)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
108 Wiley, supra note 106, at 320; see also Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners: Strangers,
Third Parties,or Parents?The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle for ParentalEquality, 40
FAM. L.Q. 23, 43 n.105 (2006) (noting that "[tihe National Gay and Lesbian Task Force has
identified twenty-five states authorizing second-parent adoption either by statute or by appellate
or trial court decisions" (citation omitted)).
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parents typically remain less protected and more vulnerable than those
headed by heterosexual parents. 109
For example, in Wakeman v. Dixon,110 same-sex partners agreed to
"jointly parent the child" and to make equal financial support
contributions.", After the second child's birth, both partners executed
an affidavit of domestic partnership to allow Dixon and the two children
to receive health insurance coverage under Wakeman's medical plan.112
A few months after, the same-sex partners' relationship dissolved and
Dixon relocated with the two children.113 Consequently, Wakeman
turned to the judicial system seeking a declaration of parental rights to
the children.114 However, the trial court ruled that it had no authority to
11 5
compel visitation, despite evidence of two co-parenting agreements.
On appeal, the court determined the agreements were unenforceable
because Florida law "does not allow non-parents to seek custody or
visitation."116 The concurring opinion recognized the gap in coverage
for the "needs of the children born into or raised in these nontraditional households when a break-up occurs" and urged the Florida
Legislature to provide a remedy for these situations.117
Implied co-parenting agreements are even more at risk. Some
courts may find an implied parenting contract if one party assumes the
role of a parent in a child's life. A party might be considered a de facto
parent ("a person who is not a parent, but is treated as if she were a
parent"118) if, on a day to day basis, she "assumes the role of parent,
109 Wiley, supra note 106, at 320-21. On the other hand, with respect to children born of
artificial insemination, not all courts will bar common law contract and promissory estoppel
causes of action for custody and visitation brought by the non-biological parent. See, e.g., In re
T.P.S., 978 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
110 921 So. 2d 669, 670-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
111 Id. at 670.
112 Id. at 670-71.
113 Id. at 671.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 673.
117 Id. at 674 (Van Nortwick, J., concurring).
118 Rena M. Lindevaldsen, Sacrificing Motherhood on the Altar Of Political Correctness:
Declaring a Legal Stranger to Be a Parentover the Objections of the Child's Biological Parent,21
REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2009). Courts often use various terms such as "in loco parentis,"
"psychological parenthood," "de facto parenthood," and "parens patriae" interchangeably. See
V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 546 n.3 (N.J. 2000) (noting that "[t]he terms psychological parent, de
facto parent, and functional parent are used interchangeably in this opinion to reflect their use in
the various cases, statutes, and articles cited"); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 167 n.7
(Wash. 2005) (en banc) (explaining "[olur cases, and cases from other jurisdictions,
interchangeably and inconsistently apply the related yet distinct terms of in loco parentis,
psychological parent, and defacto parent"). However, when determining whether a third party is
a parent, there can be important differences between these labels. Lindevaldsen, supra, at 18. In
loco parentis is applied when "someone who is not a legal parent nevertheless assumes the role of
a parent in a child's life," or, in essence, acts as a surrogate parent. Lindevaldsen, supra, at 18-19.
The termination of this status varies substantially between states, id. at 19, and application of state
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seeking to fulfill both the child's physical needs and his psychological
need for affection and care... acquires an interest in the
of the
management
and
care,
custody
companionship,
child.. . deserving of legal protection."119 For a non-biological parent to
have standing as a de facto parent she must generally show that the
biological parent fostered a parent-like relationship between her and the
child, she and the child lived together in the same household, she
assumed parental obligations without expectation of payment, and that
this period of time was sufficient to forge a bonded, dependent, parental
relationship with the child. 120
While there is no uniform test, courts often cite the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's 1995 decision in In re the Custody of H.S.H.-K. to
demonstrate that a parent-like relationship with the child existed:
1) whether the legal parent consented to or fostered the relationship
between the de facto parent and the child; 2) whether the de facto
parent lived with the child; 3) whether the de facto parent assumed
the obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for
the child's care, education and development, including contributing
towards the child's support, without expectation of financial
compensation; and 4) whether a parent-child bond was formed.121
Some of the courts that have adopted this test include New Jersey,
South Carolina, and Washington.122 Courts in other states such as
parentage statutes differs widely across the United States. Kelly M. O'Bryan, Comment, Mommy
or Daddy and Me: A Contract Solution to a Child's Loss of the Lesbian or Transgender
Nonbiological Parent, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1115, 1141 (2011). In particular, states disagree on

whether the parent-like rights and obligations continue after a legal parent has terminated the
loco parentis relationship. Lindevaldsen, supra, at 19. Psychological parenthood is commonly
described as a "parent-like relationship which is 'based on [the] day-to-day interaction,
companionship, and shared experiences' of the child and adult. As such, it may define a biological
parent, stepparent, or other person unrelated to the child." Lindevaldsen, supra, at 21 (alteration
in original) (quoting In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 167 n.7). Finally, "parens patriae literally

means 'parent of his or her country' and refers traditionally to the role of the state 'as a sovereign
[and] in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves."'
Lindevaldsen, supra, at 23-24 (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144
(8th ed. 2004)).
119 Jennifer L. Rosato, Children of Same-Sex Parents Deserve the Security Blanket of the
ParentagePresumption, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 74, 81 n.79 (2006) (quoting In re Crystal J., 111 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 646, 648-49 (Ct. App. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120 In re Parentageof L.B., 122 P.3d at 176-77.
121 COURTNEY G.JOSLIN ET AL., Judicial Protectionsfor Psychological Parents,Persons in Loco
Parentis, and Parents by Estoppel, in LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW
§ 7:5 (2014) (citing In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995)); see also
V.C., 748 A.2d at 551 (applying the following test to determine the existence of psychological
parenthood: "the legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship between the third party
and the child; the third party must have lived with the child; the third party must perform
parental functions for the child to a significant degree; and most important, a parent-child bond
must be forged").
122 V.C., 748 A.2d at 551; Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 743-44 (S.C. 2008); In re
Parentageof L.B., 122 P.3d at 176-77.
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Colorado, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia apply similar
variations of this test.123 Other more practical factors that courts may
consider include whether: (1) the parties jointly planned for the child's
birth; (2) the child has the de facto parent's surname or a combination
of both parties; (3) the de facto parent was present at the child's birth;
(4) the parties described themselves as co-parents in birth
announcements, school forms, medical records, and other records; (5)
the parties and the child lived together; (6) the parties shared the child's
caretaking and financial responsibilities; (7) both parties were involved
in decisionmaking about the child; (8) the child sent mother's day or
father's day cards to the de facto parent and other evidence that the
child viewed the person as a parent; and (9) any relevant legal
documents exist such as wills, powers of attorney, or parental
agreements. 124
The doctrines of de facto parents, psychological parents, people
who stand in loco parentis to the child, etc. vary in application from
state to state. 125 Part of the reason for the different approaches is because
the U.S. Supreme Court in 2000 left the scope of third-party visitation
rights undefined and the justices issued a splintered decision with one
plurality, two concurring, and three dissenting opinions.126 There are
states that consider non-biological and non-adoptive parents as legal
parents pursuant to the state's parentage statutes based on civil unions
and domestic partnerships.127 The states that apply these doctrines
"effectively redefine the term 'parent' to go beyond biological and
adoptive parents, thus permitting third parties to petition for
visitation." 128 For example, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that
the biological mother's same-sex partner had standing to determine
parental status and whether the visitation terms were violated even
though the child was born out of wedlock.129 In Colorado, the non-

123 See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 561 (Colo. App. 2004); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d
886, 891 (Mass. 1999); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1319-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); In re
Jonathan G., 482 S.E.2d 893, 911-12 (W. Va. 1996).
124 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 121 (citing Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 67-68 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2008)).
125 Lindevaldsen, supra note 118, at 16-18.
126 Lindsy J. Rohlf, Note, The Psychological-Parent
and De Facto-ParentDoctrines: How Should
the Uniform ParentageAct Define "Parent"?,94 IOWA L. REv. 691, 711-12 (2009) (citing Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)).
127 COURTNEY G. JOSLIN ET AL., De Facto Parents Given Full ParentalRights, in LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW, supra note 121, § 7:7; see, e.g., Della Corte v. Ramirez,
961 N.E.2d 601, 602-03 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (concluding that a same-sex couple does not need
to seek a second-parent adoption to confer legal parentage on the non-biological parent when the
child is born of the marriage).
128 Rohlf, supra note 126, at 694.
129 Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 971 (R.I. 2000).
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parent is not even required to present proof of psychological
parenthood as a condition precedent to standing.130
However, in New York, a court denied standing to a non-legal,
non-biological parent and stated any extension of visitation rights must
be from the state legislature or the Court of Appeals.131 In Matter of
Alison D. v. Virginia M., the Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner's
argument that she was a de facto parent or parent by estoppel, and thus
was not entitled to seek visitation rights. 132
Of the states that recognize these doctrines, several grant certain
constitutional rights to de facto parents even over the objection of the
child's biological or adoptive parent,133 though many other states reject
such rights for visitation or parentage purposes. 134 Other states have a
stance on this issue that falls somewhere in the middle of the two
extremes, such as North Carolina with contradictory holdings from its
intermediate appellate court.135 In Maryland, a judge may conclude that
a person is indeed a de facto parent, but may not be treated as a
parent. 136
Generally, a person establishes a de facto parent-child relationship
with the consent of the child's legal parent, either express or implied.137
There are courts that have held that a de facto parent seeking custody or
visitation rights is "constitutionally permissible because it is consistent
with the legal parent's own decision to treat the de facto parent as a
second parent to her child."138 For example, in T.B. v. L.R.M., the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated, "a biological parent's rights 'do
not extend to erasing a relationship between her partner and her child
which she voluntarily created and actively fostered simply because after

130 In re Custody of A.D.C., 969 P.2d 708, 710 (Colo. App. 1998) (citing COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14-10-123(1)(b), (c) (West 1997)).

131 Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381, 381-83 (App. Div. 2002).
132 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991). The Court of Appeals reaffirmed its holding in Alison D.
that parentage is derived from biology or adoption and any change to parenting rights is subject
to legislative action. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 194 (N.Y. 2010).
133 Lindevaldsen, supra note 118, at 16. The states that recognize such doctrines include
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Id.
134 Lindevaldsen, supra note 118, at 17. The states that reject such doctrines include Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and
Virginia. Id.
135 Lindevaldsen, supra note 118, at 17-18.
136 Lindevaldsen, supra note 118, at 18; see also Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 93 (Md.
2008) (holding that "while the psychological bond between a child and a third party is a factor in
finding exceptional circumstances, it is not determinative").
137 COURTNEY G. JOSLIN ET AL., ConstitutionalConsiderations,in LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW, supra note 121, § 7:15.
138 Id.
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the parties' separation she regretted having done SO."' 139 However, the
Ninth Circuit gave de facto parents only the "right to be present, to be
represented and to present evidence in a dependency proceeding"
without any other constitutional interests. 140
The bottom line is that in most states, the best interest of the child
standard continues to be viewed as being at odds with co-parenting
contracts when both parents are not biologically related to the child. So
even states that might be inclined to enforce a co-parenting agreement
will typically require evidence beyond the agreement. Parties must
typically show not only that the biological parent consented to the
parent-child relationship, but also that they fostered and nurtured the
relationship over time. Biology continues to be the sole or predominant
factor in determining custody, resulting in the erratic and unreliable
enforcement of co-parenting agreements.
II.

THE CONTRACTUAL FAMILY: THE ROLE THE MARKET SHOULD PLAY IN
SHAPING FAMILY FORMATIONS AND RIGHTS

People should have the right to make their own decisions regarding
their personal relationships. With the right to privacy comes individual
liberty and freedom to make personal choices, such as the choice to use
contraception or the right to abortion. It is not a stretch to extend
personal freedom to the right to decide how to organize one's family
finances and parenting. Contracts can help family members make more
enforceable agreements that clarify many more specifics than statutes
are able to. Further, family members can use contracts to plan for
changes in their relationship, or changes in the law, as well as for other
contingencies in order to negotiate around uncertainty. Some argue that
certain contracts in the family context even promote family harmony. 141
The arguments against contracting in the family context are wideranging and diverse. To begin with, many view family law as being
"local," while contract law is more "universal."142 Contract law has its
origins in "individual will, private pleasures, selfish intentions and hard

139 786 A.2d 913, 919 (Pa. 2001) (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996)); see also V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000) (stating "a psychological parent-child
relationship that is voluntarily created by the legally recognized parent may not be unilaterally
terminated after the relationship between the adults ends" because the bond between the
psychological parent and the child does not get erased with the end of the adult relationship).
140 Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Crystal J., 111 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 646, 650 (Ct. App. 2001)).

141 E. Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the "Creatures of the State": Contractingfor Child Custody
Decisionmakingin the Best Interests of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 1139 (2000).

142 Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 190
(2011).
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bargains."143 On the contrary, family law is largely viewed as being based
on emotion, generosity, and morality, meaning that contract law is out
of place in the family context. 144 In this way, applying contracts to family
may be seen as "sterilizing" the family and imposing the concepts of
"self-interest," "profit," and "investment" onto an institution in which
they do not belong.'45
Furthermore, there is great potential for inequality in bargaining
power between the parties in family relationships.146 Within families,
this disparity arises from different education levels, varied emotional
investment in the family, and disparity in family members' ability to
earn money.1 47 Intimate partners, the argument goes, cannot easily be
regulated and structured by contracts because contract doctrine assumes
equal bargaining power and the impersonal negotiation of independent
parties.148 Where contracts are applied to symbiotic relationships,
particularly ones where there is income disparity, the lower-earning
party may be left unprotected by a contract where she has not
"bargained for any legally cognizable benefit."149 Also, many contracts in
the family are not entered freely, but are the product of necessity or
obligation.150 Indeed, as one scholar puts it:
[t]o suppose that a mother faced with the prospect of losing her
children or her means of sustenance can contract freely is to discredit
the most fundamental of human bonds and to recognize the full
extent of modernity's power to alienate, sever, and exclude. Contract
has become the dominant mode of rationalizing inequality. People
are simply free, the argument goes, to make bad choices.151
Perhaps in part for these reasons, contracts between family
members are often questioned, as courts may find that the parties did
not intend to be legally bound, and that adequate consideration in a
traditional contract sense cannot be established between family
members.152 This supports a general approach of many courts to stay
5 3
out of family life by claiming a lack of competency.

143 Amy J. Cohen, The Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 91, 96-97 (2011).
144 Id.
145 Laura Weinrib, Note, Reconstructing Family: Constructive Trust at Relational Dissolution,
37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 207, 209 (2002).

146 Howard Fink & June Carbone, Between PrivateOrdering and Public Fiat: A New Paradigm
for Family Law Decision-Making,5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 3 (2003).
147 Weinrib, supra note 145, at 208.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
15 Id.
152 Fink & Carbone, supra note 146, at 7.
153 Id.

2015]

THE CONTRACTUAL FAMILY

1059

Despite these thoughtful and reasonable critiques, this Part argues
that contracts between and among family members should be enforced
in the same ways that commercial contracts are enforced. Contracts are
an efficient and necessary tool for arranging family relationships. Rather
than being at odds with family law, contract law can further the goals of
family law in protecting parents and children. Courts are already
recognizing a broader concept of family in a variety of areas as described
above. Validly entered contracts can and should provide the same
evidence of intent to be bound as marriage and biology. My proposals
herein, supporting the enforceability of cohabitation and co-parenting
agreements, give unmarried couples and non-legal intended and
psychological parents equal status and rights as their married and
biologically related counterparts. At the same time, my proposals give
contracting parties in these areas the same right to rely on their
foreseeable and legitimate expectations under their contracts and as
commercial parties.
A.

The Inflated Importance of Commercial Promises

Courts have typically been enthusiastic about upholding private
exchanges to protect commerce, the business community, and the
efficiency of the marketplace.154 Underlying this practice is the belief
that legal enforcement of voluntary exchanges is "essential to the
smooth functioning of the economic system,"155 in that "a legal system
that enforces contracts reliably and efficiently plays an important role in
economic growth."156 Commercial contracts have taken on particular
importance, especially since the development of the Uniform
154 See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 8-9 (3d ed. 1987)
(putting forth the theory that "contract law is based upon the needs of trade, sometimes stated in
terms of the mutual advantage of the contracting parties, but more often of late in terms of a tool
of the economic and social order"); Gillian K. Hadfield, Contract Law Is Not Enough: The Many
Legal Institutions that Support ContractualCommitments, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS (Claude Menard & Mary Shirley eds., Kluwer Press 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=537303 (stating that "[t]he problem of enforcing agreements in
exchange is at the heart of economic life").
155 Paul G. Mahoney, ContractLaw and Macroeconomics, 6 VA. J. 72, 81 (2003); see also Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541,
558 (2003) (explaining that "[s]ociety is ... better off when it adopts laws that improve market
functioning").
156 Mahoney, supra note 155, at 80; see also Hadfield, supra note 154, at 2 (stating that "the
effectiveness of contract law is critical to the growth of economic activity"); Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 155, at 548 (stating that "a good contract law is a necessary condition for a modern
commercial economy"). Contract enforcement affects the larger economy, in that "countries that
enforce property rights and contracts experience more rapid economic growth than those that do
not." Mahoney, supra note 155, at 77 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, enforcement of contracts
has "regularly accompanied the rise of long-distance trade among relative strangers." Id. at 78
(footnote omitted).
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Commercial Code, which identifies a primary goal of fostering the
"continued expansion of commercial practices."57 Market efficiency
and the protection of industry have also been used to justify the
enforcement of standard adhesion contracts, including shrink-wrap,
click-wrap, web-wrap, and browse-wrap license agreements.15 8 In this
Section, I do not take issue with the question of whether mass market
license agreements should be enforceable. Rather, I simply consider the
courts' willingness to enforce commercial contracts as a meter against
which to evaluate how courts should handle family contracts.
The common law has always been associated with limited
government in general and specifically with few government restrictions
on individual economic autonomy. 159 "English common law developed
as it did because landed aristocrats and merchants wanted a system of
law that would provide strong protections for property and contract
rights and limit the Crown's ability to interfere in markets."160 It follows
that common law systems are typically viewed as "productive of greater
economic growth."161

In the common law tradition, modern contract law has shown
primary concern for protection of contract rights and economic
freedom,162 with less attention typically given to social institutions and
non-traditional subject areas such as protection of employees, the
environment, or public health and welfare. 163 Modern contract law

157 U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1977). With the advent of the U.C.C. in the 1960s, the law saw a shift
away from the old "I-sell-my-horse-or-manner-to-you" paradigm toward greater emphasis on
commerce.
158 As explained in comment a of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 211,
"[s]tandardization of agreements serves many of the same functions as standardization of goods
and services; both are essential to a system of mass production and distribution. Scarce and costly
time and skill can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than to details of individual
transactions." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981); see also Todd D.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1221 (1983)
(noting that standardization of terms "reduces transaction costs.... [and] stabilize[s] the
incidents of doing business"); Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer:
The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOzO L. REV. 319, 325 (1999)
(noting that "[s]ince the forms can be customized, operations are simplified and costs reduced to
the advantage of all concerned" (footnote omitted)); Sierra David Sterkin, Comment, Challenging
Adhesion Contracts in California: A Consumer's Guide, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 285, 292
(2004) (noting that "[bly treating all its customers with the same 'standard and fixed' manner, a
company can act with greater 'efficiency, simplicity, and stability' (footnote omitted)).
159 Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 503, 504 (2001).
160 Id. at 504.
161 Hadfield, supra note 154, at 5.
162 Mahoney, supra note 159, at 508.
163 Friedrich Hayek argued that "English and French concepts of law stemmed from English
and French models of liberty, the first (derived from Locke and Hume) emphasizing the
individual's freedom to pursue individual ends and the second (derived from Hobbes and
Rousseau) emphasizing the government's freedom to pursue collective ends." Id. at 511 (citing
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 54-70 (1960)); see also Daniel R. Ernst,
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reflects a sea of change in the courts-notably, the abandonment of
equity as a fundamental component in analyzing contract claims in
favor of the enforcement of business contracts based solely on a promise
for a promise and sufficient consideration.164 The drive for free
contracting did not come in the sixteenth century when the Crown's
power was at its zenith or at the point when the powers of the nobility
and the gentry were at their peak in the eighteenth century. Rather, the
push came in the nineteenth century, when the commercial classes
began to take a powerful role in society. 165 Whereas contract law in the
eighteenth century expressed hostility "to the interests of commercial
classes," ' 166 by inquiring into the fairness of the exchange, modern
contract law, spurred by the fluctuating nature of the modern market
economy, rejected the premise that fairness could be objectively
measured. 167 At the same time, courts moved away from reflecting the
legal and ethical mores of small businesspeople and farmers and came to
represent the interests of larger commercial interests. 168
Nineteenth century courts embraced the "will theory" of contract,
which relied on offer, acceptance, and consideration to find a valid
contract. Will theory was readily used to the advantage of employers in
labor contract cases, where courts frequently acquiesced to unjust terms
in labor contracts based on the myth that they were freely bargained. 169
The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 1019, 1020 (1993)
(reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992)) (describing the "Lochner era" as the era surrounding "the
1905 decision of the United States Supreme Court that most notably defended 'liberty of contract'
from the intrusions of social legislation" (footnote omitted)). J. Willard Hurst and his followers
"stressed the economic forces influencing American legal policy in the nineteenth century" and
recognized a changed attitude in the twentieth century based on the notion that "unchecked
economic aggrandizement had produced many social costs that needed to be paid and that the
expansion of some men's liberty had come at the expense of others' oppression." Michael E.
Parrish, Friedman's Law, 112 YALE L.J. 925, 932 (2003) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002)) (citing JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND
THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 33-108 (1956)).

164 Morton J. Horwitz, The HistoricalFoundationsof Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV.
917, 917-19 (1974).
165 Id. Horwitz has been much criticized, even vilified, by other legal scholars. See Robert W.
Gordon, Morton Horwitz and His Critics: A Conflict of Narratives,37 TULSA L. REV. 915, 918-19
(2002). A.W.B. Simpson's seminal article, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts,46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533, 600 (1979), challenged Horwitz's claim that the will theory was a product of the
nineteenth century and that the judiciary had been guided by equitable concerns. However,
Patrick Atiyah's book, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract,supported much of Horwitz's
scholarship. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 671-72, 674
(1979). See Gordon, supra, at 915-27 for an interesting and concise discussion of the
philosophical clash between Horwitz and his peers.
166 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 167
(1997).
167 See Horwitz, supra note 164, at 949.
168 HORWITZ, supra note 166.
169 See id. at 186-87. For example, in Coolidge v. Puaaiki,3 Haw. 810, 813-14 (1877), rather
than inquire into the unjust terms of a plantation worker's contract, the court assumed it was
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However, the dogmatic approach to will theory was not applied with
equal force to building contracts, for which the courts allowed recovery
on a quantum meruit theory, despite the existence of a contract with
express terms. 170 This bifurcation illustrates the fledgling class bias of
the courts in favor of commercial players.171 Morton Horwitz argues
forcefully that courts continue to apply the old equitable principles
when they intentionally choose the parties who will receive their

beneficence. 172
Courts will rarely consider the inherent fairness of a transaction
and will enforce one-sided bargains if evidence shows they were freely
entered, particularly in the commercial context where true assent is not
always requisite to enforcement.
Indeed, courts are typically willing to forego formalistic rules of
contracting to enforce contracts in the commercial context, particularly
in the context of adhesion contracts involving disparities in bargaining
power and limited assent to boilerplate terms, such as with end user
license agreements. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or
Code) offers additional flexibility when it comes to commercial
contracts. Despite the frequent lack of true assent to vital terms in
adhesion contracts, these contracts have become the backbone of
modern contracting because of their perceived efficiency and
predictability. Adhesion contracts are beneficial to both businesses and
consumers. Standardization of terms "reduces transaction costs.., and
stabilize[s] the incidents of doing business,"17s thereby saving both the
buyer and seller money.174 Businesses prefer uniformity in transactions
and a quick and smooth flow of business. 175 Consumers are also unlikely
to benefit from having to negotiate each and every consumer
transaction in the marketplace, as a close reading of standard form
contracts at the time of purchase "seems grossly arduous."176 As

freely bargained for, based on the parties' signatures. The court, in willfully ignoring the realities
of plantation laborers' bargaining power, stated, "[i]f they wished to confine themselves to any
particular kind of labor, they should have themselves caused it to have been designated in their
contract .... " Id. The court upheld the contract, although it was the plantation owner's wife who
had signed the instrument. Id.
170 Horwitz, supra note 164, at 954.
171 Horwitz, supra note 164, at 955.
172 Horwitz, supra note 164, at 955-56.
173 Rakoff, supra note 158.
174 Id. at 1222. Professor Rakoff explains that standardization "promote[s] efficiency" and
"make[s] it possible to process transactions as a matter of routine." Id.; see also Goodman, supra
note 158 (noting that "[s]ince the forms can be customized, operations are simplified and costs
reduced to the advantage of all concerned" (footnote omitted)).
175 Sterkin, supra note 158 (noting that "(bly treating all its customers with the same 'standard
and fixed' manner, a company can act with greater 'efficiency, simplicity, and stability"' (footnote
omitted)).
176 Rakoff, supra note 158, at 1226; see also Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in
Securities FraudLitigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 337, 379 (2003) (noting
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explained in comment a of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
section 211, "[s]tandardization of agreements serves many of the same
functions as standardization of goods and services; both are essential to
a system of mass production and distribution. Scarce and costly time
and skill can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than to details
of individual transactions."l7 Over the years, there has been extensive
scholarly debate regarding the fairness of holding a consumer to terms

she likely has not read,178 but generally, courts will enforce adhesion
contracts unless they are unconscionable or violate public policy. 179
economists argue that "adhesion contracts are generally necessary in that it is logistically
impossible in our commercial world for both parties to negotiate the terms of each individual
contract" (footnote omitted)); Sterkin, supra note 158, at 287 (noting that "[iun many situations,
negotiating individual contracts with each consumer would be impractical, for both cost and time
considerations" (footnote omitted)).
177 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981). In his book, Karl Llewellyn
explained the utility of "form-pad" agreements as follows:
[B]y standardizing terms, and by standardizing even the spot on the form where any
individually dickered term appears, one saves all the time and skill otherwise needed to
dig out and record the meaning of variant language; one makes check-up, totaling,
follow-through, etc., into routine operations; one has duplicates (in many colors)
available for the administration of a multidepartment business; and so on more. The
content of the standardized terms accumulates experience, it avoids or reduces legal
risks and also confers all kinds of operating leeways and advantages, all without need of
either consulting counsel from instance to instance or of bargaining with the other
parties.
N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362 (1960).
See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 176, at 380 (noting that "[ilt is difficult to argue plausibly that
the parties are negotiating to an efficient end when one side does not negotiate nor, typically, even
read the contract before signing it" (footnote omitted)); Rakoff, supra note 158, at 1190, 1197
(arguing that, with respect to adhesion contracts, "if the presumption of enforceability is retained,
it threatens to continue to generate undesirable results"); W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971)
(arguing that with form adhesion contracts business parties are tempted to impose one-sided and
unfair provisions); Sterkin, supra note 158, at 323 (arguing that "[clonsumers need judicial
protection from oppressive contractual terms" often found in adhesion contracts).
179 See, e.g., Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that adhesion
contracts are enforceable under Tennessee law unless they are unconscionable); Ticknor v. Choice
Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that adhesion contracts are
enforceable unless they are "unduly oppressive, unconscionable, or against public policy"); Bull
HN Info. Sys. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 331 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that adhesion contracts are
enforceable under Massachusetts law unless they are unconscionable, unfair, or offend public
KARL
178

policy); Smith, Bucklin & Assocs., Inc. v. Sonntag, 83 F.3d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that
adhesion contracts are enforceable unless they are unconscionable or violate public policy). See
generally 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 18:5 (4th ed. 1998) (stating that adhesion contracts are generally enforceable absent
unconscionability or violation of public policy); Rakoff, supra note 158, at 1176 (setting forth the
general presumption in contract law that "contracts of adhesion, like negotiated contracts, are
prima facie enforceable as written"); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and
Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 233, 250-51 (2002) (explaining that "the judiciary's response
to adhesion contracts... still is to assume manifestation of assent and to apply the 'you signed it,
you're bound' rule," subject only to "the enforceability defenses of unconscionability, fraud, and
public policy").
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Another example of prioritizing the enforcement of commercial
contracts over the need for assent is found in the underlying principles
and rules of the UCC itself. The UCC, a realist code, 180 operates largely
under the broad premise that "courts should enforce private ordering
arrangements."18l Drafted by Karl Llewelyn, the UCC is "specifically
designed to give greater legal recognition and enforcement to sales
contracts ... ."182 In particular, Article 2 was meant to alleviate "the
apparent rigidity and incompatibility [of pre-Code law] with
commercial norms"183 by "adopting pragmatic rules that reflect the
commercial practices that business people actually employ."184
Accordingly, the drafters assured that if contracting parties intended to
create a contract, courts would find an enforceable contract even if one
or more crucial terms were omitted,185 or where the terms in the
acknowledgement were different from or added to the terms in the
purchase order.186 Under Article 2, it is not necessary to identify the
precise moment a contract was formed in order for it to be
enforceable,187 and the acceptance need not be a mirror image of the
offer. 188
Additionally, although applicable to all sales of goods, Article 2 has
carved out a series of special rules for merchants, many of which protect
actual business practices by recognizing and enforcing contracts, despite
180 See John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretationand the Lessons of Llewellyn, 33 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 263, 268-69 (2000). Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafter, believed that "the meaning of a
sales contract depends upon the commercial and historical context within which it is made and
executed." Id.
181 Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 547, 556 (1999).
182 John P. Esser, InstitutionalizingIndustry: The Changing Forms of Contract,21 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 593, 596 (1996); Jane M. Rolling, The UCC Under Wraps: Exposing the Need for More
Notice to Consumers of Computer Software with Shrinkwrapped Licenses, 104 COM. L.J. 197, 204
(1999) (noting that "[i]n general, contracts are easier to form under the UCC").
183 Larry T. Garvin, Credit,Information, and Trust in the Law of Sales: The Credit Seller's Right
of Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 247, 263 (1996).
184 Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of the Common
Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 18 (1997); see also Courtney Lytle Perry, My Kingdom for a Horse:
Reining in Runaway Legislation from Software to Spain, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 523, 545
(2005). These default rules "promot[e] predictability in order to facilitate transactions" and
"save[] everybody time and money." Rolling, supra note 182, at 200 (footnotes omitted).
185 U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1994).
186 U.C.C. § 2-207 (1994).
187 U.C.C. § 2-204(2).
188 U.C.C. § 2-207; see also Rubin, supra note 184 (noting that "[in drafting Article 2,
Llewellyn dispensed with the rule of title, perfect tender, and the mirror image rule for offer and
acceptance, replacing them with flexible provisions for allocating loss, curing defects, and
enabling the transaction to go forward despite minor disagreements" (footnote omitted)).
Another example can be found in section 2-202, the U.C.C.'s "quite relaxed version of the parol
evidence rule," which permits the introduction of all evidence of trade usage, course of dealing,
and course of performance to explain or supplement the contract, as long as it does not directly
contradict the written agreement, and any consistent additional terms that do not contradict, as
long as the contract is not fully integrated. See Breen, supra note 180, at 269.
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some informality or flaws in the bargaining process or the execution of
the contract.189 For example, section 2-201(2) broadens the type and
content of writings required between merchants to satisfy the statute of
frauds,190 and section 2-205, which deals with firm offers, allows
merchants to create an option that is binding for up to three months
and that only requires a signed writing.191 Informality and flexibility
protect commercial parties from facing unenforceable contracts when,
contrary to their intentions, it is in the interest of market efficiency.
Default rules with such flexibility generally protect the business
community,92 and "stimulate[] and structure[] future commercial
growth...."193 The UCC has displayed little sympathy for consumer
concerns, focusing its efforts primarily on commercial interests, which
have been said to "dominate the... UCC drafting process."194
B.

Giving Family Promisesthe Same Weight and Protection as
CommercialPromises

This Section advocates for greater and more consistent
enforceability of cohabitation
and co-parenting agreements.
Enforcement of such contracts gives unmarried couples and non-legal
intended and psychological parents equal status and rights as their
married and biologically related counterparts. At the same time,
enforcing these contracts also maintains necessary consistency with
commercial promises, while keeping pace with our changing culture.

189 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2-209, 2-312, 2-314, 2-316(2), 2-327(1)(c), 2-402(2), 2403(2), 2-509(3), 2-603, 2-605, 2-609 (1994). See generallyRustad, supra note 181, at 557 n.72.
190 U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1994). Under the merchant's exception, a writing between merchants
satisfies the statute of frauds:

[1If within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient
against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its
contents ... unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within 10 days
after it is received.

Id.
(1994).
192 Rustad, supranote 181, at 557.
193 Rolling, supra note 182, at 202; see also Michael H. Dessent, Digital Handshakes in
191 U.C.C. § 2-205

Cyberspace Under E-Sign: "There's a New Sheriff in Town!", 35 U. RICH. L. REv. 943, 950 (2002)
(explaining that the U.C.C. is meant "to do away with many of the old common law conventions
that plagued contract law and impeded efficient business transactions" (footnote omitted)).
194 Rubin, supra note 184, at 13; see also Rolling, supra note 182, at 225 (noting that "although
the UCC was designed for both commercial parties and consumers, in practice the UCC may
protect commercial parties more efficiently because business people are often more likely to be
more familiar with the provisions of the UCC" (footnote omitted)).
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1. Cohabitation Agreements
Non-married cohabiting couples should be able to choose through
private contract to subject themselves to all or some of the government
protections granted to married couples that do not implicate the right of
the government or other third parties.195 They should also be able to
agree to any additional or different arrangements between themselves as
they see necessary or convenient to their personal relationship.
When courts choose not to enforce contracts between non-married
partners it is often based on policies that seek to promote marriage.
However, with the rise of unmarried cohabitation-which corresponds
to "greater societal acceptance, advances in contraception, and changed
views regarding the morality of cohabiting women"196-this goal is no
longer appropriate. This Section argues that the State's interest in
promoting marriage is misplaced and that contracts can and should
provide an acceptable alternative to marriage. In this Section I argue
that cohabitation agreements between consenting adults about private
matters relating to their relationship and finances should be enforced as
written. Contracts can be a useful alternative to marriage for couples
that do not want legal intrusion into their relationship. Along with state
recognition comes the imposition of a bundle of rights and
responsibilities that the couple might not otherwise agree to. Stateprovided rights and responsibilities do not fit all "family" types. People
in non-marital unions often seek to order their affairs in ways that are
not possible under state-based options. Couples should not have to
subscribe to those rights and responsibilities in order to receive the
state-sponsored economic benefits that come with marriage.
a. The Primacy of Marriage
Despite wide ranging critiques of marriage, 197 the State has always
had an interest in marriage. This interest is apparent from the benefits
granted upon marriage. The significant financial rewards that come to
married couples, such as health, life, and disability benefits, not only
provide greater economic stability to the married couple,198 but also
alleviate a potential cost burden on the State. Additionally, married
couples receive important tax benefits. As Professor Ruthann Robson
points out, "the entire federal tax scheme fosters and subsidizes the

See supra Part II.A.
196 Merrill, supra note 1, at 510.
197 See infra Part II.B.l.b.
198 David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage": The First Amendment and Marriageas an
Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 925, 931 (2001).
195
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economics of marriage."199 As a result, "those who do not participate in
the 'economic partnership' of matrimony may suffer financially."200
Setting economic benefits within the construct of marriage elevates
the status of marriage and herds couples into marriage, thereby
promoting that interest in marriage. In Professor Robson's seminal
article on the subject, she discusses the primacy of marriage and the
"zeal of elected federal officials to exalt marriage."201 This Section
examines which values are promoted with marriage and why they are
promoted.
Presumably the primary values that are promoted through
marriage relate to sexual behavior. Marriage can be seen as promoting
abstinence from sex outside marriage, and in particular, abstinence
from premarital sex by teenagers and young adults. Marriage also
promotes monogamy and opposite-sex relationships, and is often
regarded as "the expected standard of human sexual activity."202 As
Professor Robson notes, the government message fostered by sex
education is that marriage is the "only acceptable condition for sexual
expression."203
In addition to promoting sexual behavioral norms, marriage is
thought to be the best environment for raising healthy and successful
children. The State considers marriage an "essential institution of a
successful society" and the optimal environment for successful child
rearing.204 The current rationale, at least in part, is based on legislative
findings from "welfare reform" legislation, the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996. Among
other things, Congress found that children born out of wedlock,
specifically to unwed mothers age seventeen and under, are more likely
to experience abuse and neglect, have lower cognitive scores and
educational aspirations, become teenage parents themselves, and be on
welfare when they grow up.205
The State's concerns with family values dovetails seamlessly with
the economic interest in preventing unwed motherhood. Congress

199 Robson, supra note 6, at 786.
200 Id. at 783.
201 Id. at 795. Robson notes that

"The PRWORA, passed in [the 104th Congressional] session,
is replete with hortatory claims for marriage, including its finding that 'marriage is the foundation
of a successful society."' Id. at 795 (quoting Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity

Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, Title I § 101(1), 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 601 (notes))). Similarly, Congressional discussions about DOMA were "replete with the
image of marriage as the elemental building block of society, whether that be a rock, a foundation,
a pillar, or a keystone." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
202

42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2)(D) (2014).

203

Robson, supra note 6, at 798.

204 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, Title I §§ 101(2)-(3), 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (notes)).
205 Id. §§ 101(8)(B)-(F) (statement of congressional findings found in PRWORA).
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found that young, unwed mothers are not only more likely to go on
public assistance, but also more likely to remain on public assistance for
longer periods. "These combined effects of 'younger and longer'
increase total AFDC [aid to families with dependent children] costs per
household by twenty to thirty-five percent for 17-year-olds."206 Notably,
Congress also found that an "increase in the number of children
receiving public assistance is closely related to the increase in births to
unmarried women."207
Although welfare reforms of the 1990s present our most salient
example of the State's economic interest in the family, examples are
certainly not limited to current public policy. The State has always had a
hand in shaping the institution of marriage for the best economic
outcomes. The capitalist logic underlying the regulation of marriage is a
deeply situated phenomenon that lacks a clear trajectory within a
historical analysis.20s However, a quick survey of the family throughout
U.S. history would demonstrate how the institution of marriage is
recreated and refrained with the changing economic landscape. For
example, the 1990s concern with single mothers was framed as an issue
of family values, but the objective of welfare reform was to insist women
work at low-paying jobs if they wanted to receive government
entitlements and assistance. This is in stark contrast to the post-Civil
War development of the welfare system for the purposes of supporting
widowed and non-working women in a "male breadwinner" economy
that was considered the optimum economic family model by the State.
Though a survey of historical family structures and policy is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is not reaching to assert that marriage is one of
the State's primary political and economic institutions.
Critiques and Limitations of Marriage
Despite recent celebrations of marriage, and despite the State's
clear interest in its elevated status, there are many reasons that couples
may not marry. Some couples face legal impediments to marriage, while
others have social or political reasons for choosing not to marry.
There are various laws that prevent some couples from legally
marrying. Same-sex couples in many states still do not have the legal
right to marry. While United States v. Windsor struck down the federal
government's definition of marriage as the union of one man and one
woman under the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),209 currently, only
seventeen states and Washington D.C. issue marriage licenses to sameb.

206

Id. § 101(8)(A) (statement of congressional findings found in PRWORA).

207

Id. § 101(5)(C) (statement of congressional findings found in PRWORA).
THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF

208

SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 40 (1992).

209 United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
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sex couples.210 Same-sex couples should be able to contract around
legislatures' conservative classifications of family and make agreements
that are appropriate to their relationships, despite the lasting influence
of patriarchy on family law.211 Contracts may help overthrow family
law's conservatism and patriarchal history by "habituat[ing]
heterosexuals to the notion of gay rights, setting the stage for public
rights for gay people."212 In addition, laws prevent a couple from
marrying where one partner is still legally married to someone else.213
Marriage between relatives is also legally barred, as are polygamous
marriages.214
In addition, some couples that have the legal right to marry may
choose not to marry for a variety of reasons. Some couples may oppose
the institution of marriage itself, for social, political, or economic
reasons, or based on disparities historically perpetuated by the
institution of marriage.215 For other couples, marriage simply may not
be a deal worth making. Both men and women on the lower rungs of the
economic ladder have far fewer choices when it comes to marriage.
While higher-earning adults tend to marry other educated high-income
adults, low-income, less-educated adults tend either not to marry or to
marry other similarly situated adults. With fewer marriageable
prospects, the costs of the marital bargain may exceed the benefits.216
i.

Historical Critiques of Marriage
Historically, "[miarriage was the principal institution that
maintained the patriarchy."217 A free woman's legal rights depended on
her marital status; 218 single women had more rights than married
women at common law. As long as a woman remained unmarried she
could enter into contracts, buy and sell real estate, and accumulate
personal property, which included cash, stocks, and livestock. An

See supra note 16.
Fink and Carbone, supra note 146, at 6.
212 See Ertman, supra note 53, at 1137-42, 1154 (1996).
213 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 6 (McKinney 2014).
214 See, e.g., id. § 5; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (remarking that the
United States' restriction of polygamous marriage outweighed a Mormon's right to his religious
practice).
215 See infra Part II.B.l.b.i. See generally SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX, at xvi (H.M.
Parshley ed. & trans., First Vintage Books 1974) (1949) (discussing the marginalization of women
as "other" in male-created culture).
216 See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: How INEQUALITY IS REMAKING
THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014).
217 Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 167, 170 (1999).
218 Enslaved black women were not allowed to marry, have custody of children, own property,
control their bodies, or earn money from their labor. Darlene C. Goring, The History of Slave
Marriagein the United States, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 307-11 (2006).
210
211
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unmarried woman could also sue or be sued, write wills, and act as an
219
executor of an estate.
Under the common law system, once married, a woman lost her
autonomy and was subsumed under her husband's identity.220 As the
English jurist William Blackstone stated in his influential treatise

Commentarieson English Law (1765-1769):
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in the law: that is
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of
the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs
everything.221

Until the middle of the nineteenth century Blackstone's description
of coverture described the legal status of married women at common
law.222 Under coverture a married woman could not own property
independently of her husband unless they had signed a marriage
settlement prior to getting married.223 Marriage settlements were rare
and illegal in many states.

224

The husband acquired an estate in the

wife's real property for the duration of the marriage and he was entitled
to sole possession and control of any property that the wife owned.225
When a woman married, all personal property a woman brought to her
marriage, earned or acquired during marriage, became the property of
her husband to dispose of as he saw

fit.226

When a woman married, she retained ownership and legal title to
her land, but she relinquished all rights to control it. Her husband
gained the right to manage the land and rent the property, and all
219 Yvette Joy Liebesman, No Guarantees:Lessons from the PropertyRights Gained and Lost by
Married Women in Two American Colonies, 27 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 181,183 (2006).
220 Norma Basch, Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-Century
America, 5 FEMINIST STUD. 346, 347 (1979); see also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872)
(Bradley, J., concurring) ("It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any of
the duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the married state, but these are
exceptions to the general rule.").
221 Sarah Miller Little, A Woman of Property: From Being It to Controlling It. A Bicentennial
Perspective on Women and Ohio PropertyLaw, 1803 to 2003, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 177, 178
(2005).
222 D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 224 (4th ed. 2009).
223 See generally Richard H. Chused, Married Women's PropertyLaw: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J.

1359 (1983); Marylynn Salmon, Women and Property in South Carolina: The Evidence from
MarriageSettlements, 1730 to 1830,39 WM. &MARY Q. 655 (1982).
224 See Chused, supra note 223, at 1366 (noting that most jurisdictions "did not pass statutes
granting married women contractual or testamentary control over property held at law until well
into the nineteenth century" (footnote omitted)); Salmon, supra note 223, at 684 (explaining how
marriage settlements were permitted but rarely used in South Carolina, and either not permitted
or rarely used in most other jurisdictions).
225 Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of
the Familyand the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1661 (2003).
226 Little, supra note 221, at 179.
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profits from rent or the sale of crops became the husband's personal
property. 227 The common law system prevented the husband from
selling her real estate without the written consent of the wife. In order to
ensure that the wife was not being coerced into selling her property, the
wife and the judge would go into a separate room where the wife could
give consent free of coercion.228 Many critics noted that the transaction
could not truly be free of coercion, due to the fact that the woman was
powerless in all other aspects of her martial relation.229
The common law also stipulated that the wife had no right to her
husband's property. All of his personal property (and her "property")
could be disposed of by the husband and was subject to the reach of the
husband's creditors.230 If creditors pursued a husband for debts, the wife
was entitled to keep only the bare necessities of life.231 Additionally,
under common law, married women were not allowed to enter into
contracts except as their husband's agent. 232
At common law the husband also enjoyed substantial rights over
the body of his wife. Husbands were allowed to punish their wives
physically as long as the corporal punishment did not cause permanent
injury.233 Husbands were also legally permitted to restrict their wives
movements; rape their wives; physically restrain wives from leaving the
household; force her to come back to the household if she left; and
conclusively determine where the couple would reside.234 Historically,
marriage left women without legal rights or legal personhood.235
Until the late 20th century, marital rape exemption laws-laws that
allowed husbands to brutally beat their wives without fear of

227 Little, supra note 221, at 179-80.
228 Little, supra note 221, at 180.
229 Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of MaritalRape, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1373, 1389 (2000).
230 Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 383, 385-86
(1994).
231 WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 222, at 225.

232 Marie T. Reilly, In Good Times and in Debt: The Evolution of Marital Agency and the
Meaning of Marriage,87 NEB. L. REV. 373, 376-77 (2008). The main protection that a wife had

from her husband's conveyances was her right of dower. Dower is a property interest of a married
woman which she could only possess when she became a widow. This right was conceived as a
legal safeguard against the destitution of widows and goes back to at least the twelfth century.
Little, supra note 221, at 181. A married woman was entitled to one-third of the husband's real
property if they had children and one-half if the couple was childless. The dower is the widow's
only entitlement. A widow was not entitled to the property that she brought into the marriage and
could only receive the property if her husband stipulated that she should receive it after his death.
If a husband died without a will, the wife would only receive the dower and the remaining
property would be divided up among the husband's other descendants. Id. at 180-8 1.
233 Hasday, supra note 229.
.,
234 Id. at 1390-92.

235 Polikoff, supra note 217, at 169.
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prosecution236-existed under the statutory law of every state and the
common law.237 These laws were justified by the idea that: (1) a husband
has a "marital right" to sexual intercourse with his wife since "marriage
constitutes a contract" and the terms of such contract include "a wife's
irrevocable consent to have sexual intercourse with her husband
whenever he wants;"238 (2) a woman's identity "merge[s] into that of her
husband['s] upon their marriage," and thus "a husband [can] not be
charged with raping his wife, as that would equate to raping himself;"239
(3) women are the property of their husbands, and thus "rape [is] not a
crime against a woman; rather, it [is] a crime against a man's property
interest;"240 and (4) "the preservation of marital privacy and domestic
harmony require[s] that the law stay out of the relationship between
husband and wife."241
Furthermore, for the majority of our country's history, "a
husband's use of physical violence to exert power and control over his
wife was not conceptualized as domestic violence."242 In fact, before
"1970, the term 'domestic violence' referred to ghetto riots and urban
terrorism, not the abuse of women by their intimate partners."243 Many
of the same beliefs that supported the justification for marital rape
exemption laws discussed above also justified: (1) a husband's
"entitle[ment] to correct [his wife's] behavior as he would that of a
servant or child;"244 and (2) official policies that directed law
enforcement officials to treat "domestic" incidents as non-criminal
matters and to refrain from arresting the perpetrator. 245
ii. Current Critiques of Marriage
Today marriage continues to be an institution that can
disadvantage women; many feminists argue that the historical nature of
the institution of marriage is "preserved in the present social

236 Jessica Klarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape Law's Failure to Keep Up with
Domestic Violence Law, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1819, 1825 (2011).
237 See id. at 1819.
238 Id. at 1825.
239 Id. at 1826.
240 Id.
241

Id.

242 Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalizationof Domestic Violence:

A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 31, 32 (2009).
243 Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change:A Reply to the Critics of Battered Women's
Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 155 (2004) (citing Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward
Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1285, 1290 n.42 (2000)).
244 Sack, supra note 242, at 33.
245 Id. at 34 (citing Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 19701990, 83 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47-48 (1992)).
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institution."246 Their concern is not without basis. Marriage continues to
be a "venue in which.., domestic violence often occurs;" continues to
"perpetuate[] the gendered division of labor roles;" and continues to be
"acentral instrument in the denial of women's status as full citizens."247

For instance, many people still equate a marriage license with a "hitting
license."248 Statistics show that "marriages that include violence against
the woman represent a relatively widespread phenomenon in our
society,"249 and "community-based research indicates that almost one
out of every four married women will be struck by their husbands at
some time during their marriage."250
The institution of marriage is still harmful to many women because
marriage remains a "key site" for the "intimacy discount"-the
American Criminal Justice System's tendency to treat "crimes within
'the family' as less serious than crimes outside the family."251 As a result,
many victims of rape or other sexual offenses do not receive the justice
they deserve, or have to work harder for it, simply because the offender
was their spouse. 252 The way the criminal justice system treats sex
offenses committed within marriages is one example of the "longlasting" marks that the historical nature of marriage has left. 253
Although laws prohibiting violence within marriage have clearly
seen great statutory strides over the last few decades,254 the "link

246 See Candice A. Garcia-Rodrigo, An Analysis of and Alternative to the Radical Feminist
Position on the Institution of Marriage, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 113, 115 (2008); see also Robson,
supra note 6 (noting that "marriage implicates serious and insoluble problems of equality").
247 Erez Aloni, RegisteringRelationships,87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 619-20 n.210 (2013).
248 I Married A Monster The Horrors of Domestic Violence, 51 R.I. B.J. 29, 30 (2003)
[hereinafter Speaking Out] (quoting Murray A. Straus, Sexual Inequality, Cultural Norms, and
Wife-Beating, in WOMEN INTO WIVES: THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MARRIAGE 59
(Jane R. Chapman & Margaret Gates eds., 1977) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
249 Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991); see also Speaking Out, supra note 248 (noting that "[vliolence is a
common occurrence in ten (10%) to twenty-five (25%) per cent of all marriages in the United
States and cuts across all racial, age and economic lines" (citing TAMARA L. ROLEFF, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 16-17 (2000))).
250 Sana Loue, Intimate Partner Violence Bridging the Gap Between Law and Science, 21 J.
LEGAL MED. 1, 1 (2000) (citing MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN
THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1980)).
25i Angela P. Harris, Loving Before and After the Law, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2843-44
(2008).
252 See id. at 2843; see also Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships,
and Improper Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses By Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465,
1472-73 (2003); Klarfeld, supra note 236, at 1819-20 (2011).
253 See Garcia-Rodrigo, supra note 246, at 117.
254 In the mid 1970s, state legislatures and courts finally began to realize that there was no
place for marital rape exemptions in "modern American law and society." Klarfeld, supra note
236, at 1819 (quoting People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)). During this
period, marital rape exemption laws began to dissolve. Id. at 1826; Sack, supra note 242, at 35. In
fact by 1993, all fifty states and the District of Columbia recognized marital rape as a crime.
Klarfeld, supra note 236, at 1819.
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between marriage and a reluctance to challenge family violence" is still
believed to remain.255 These traditional beliefs that once supported
marital rape exemption laws and were perpetrated throughout society,
continue to impact the way that states treat sex crimes committed
within marriage. For instance, even in jurisdictions that criminalize
marital rape, "the penalties for marital rape remain lower than for nonmarital rape."256
Furthermore, as of 2003, spousal immunity still remains a defense
to certain sexual offenses in twenty-six states. 257 For instance, in twenty
states, a husband cannot be prosecuted for having non-consensual
intercourse with his wife if she was unable to consent due to
unconsciousness or incapacitation.258 Additionally, in fifteen states, a
husband cannot be prosecuted for sexual offenses committed against his
wife unless (1) his wife promptly complains; (2) his wife shows that
"extra force" was used; or (3) he and his wife are separated or
divorced.259
In these jurisdictions, the mere status of being married to their
offenders makes the crime more difficult to prosecute and consequently
puts these women at a disadvantage to their unmarried counterparts. 60
This is ironic considering that "numerous studies have shown that
marital rape is frequently quite violent and generally has more severe,
traumatic effects on the victim than other rape" outside the marriage.2 61
By affording husbands who commit sexual offenses against their wives'
"unwarranted status preference," these states continue to degrade
married victims all over again. 262
The way that the American Criminal Justice system treats domestic
violence today is another example of the "long-lasting" marks that the
historical nature of marriage has left.263 Despite great advances in the
legal treatment of domestic violence,264 "the criminal law system still
255 Harris, supra note 251, at 2843.
256

Id.

257 Anderson, supra note 252, at 1468-71.
258 Id. at 1471.
259 Id. at 1471-72.
260 See Anderson, supra note 252; Kiarfeld, supra note 236, at 1819-20.
261 See People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 575 (N.Y. 1984) (citations omitted).
262 Anderson, supra note 252.
263 See Garcia-Rodrigo, supra note 246, at 117.
264 By the mid 1970s, state legislatures began enacting domestic violence

reform statutes.
Kinports, supra note 243, at 156. By the mid 1980s, "mandatory and pro-arrest laws" were
beginning to be seen in State's statutory schemes governing domestic violence. Sack, supra note
242, at 35. This "profound shift in domestic violence policy" led Congress to pass the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), which was "the first comprehensive federal response to the
problem of domestic violence." Kinports, supra note 243, at 156 (footnote omitted); Sack, supra
note 242, at 36 (footnote omitted). The VAWA is believed to be both a culmination of the
"profound shift in domestic violence policy" and "the beginning of its institutionalization." Id.
(footnotes omitted). Today, every state, including the District of Columbia, has domestic violence
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exhibits a great reluctance to interfere in the private life of the family."265

This reluctance likely stems from the historical view that "the
preservation of marital privacy and domestic harmony require[s] that
the law stay out of the relationship between husband and wife."266
Feminist scholars routinely criticize this "overwhelming respect for
families [still] afforded by our law," and "express discomfort that the
state subsidizes a domain in which women and children are routinely
dominated."267 The criminal justice system's continued deference to
families is believed to, at the very least, "facilitate the perpetuation of
gender hierarchy and domestic violence."268

Although it is not clear whether domestic violence is more
prevalent among married couples than non-married cohabitants,

domestic violence may nonetheless be harder on married women.
Married women are more likely than their unmarried counterparts to be
financially dependent on their abusers: "Cohabitants are less likely than
married couples to support their partners. They are much more likely to

split expenses instead of pooling their resources. They are more likely
than married couples to value independence."269 Domestic violence
victims who are financially dependent on their abusive spouses are more

likely to stay in the marriage out of fear that they will be unable to
support themselves financially if they leave.270 This effect of marriage on
domestic violence is thus multi-layered: first, the institution of marriage
continues to subordinate women 271 by reinforcing traditional gender
roles,272 which contribute to inequality in marriage and fortify women's
financial dependency on their husbands;273 second, this cycle of

reform statutes that-at the very least-offer victims the opportunity to get a temporary order of
protection against their abuser on an ex parte basis, and which authorize longer-term protective
orders "with far-reaching remedies." Kinports, supra note 243, at 156 (citing CLARE DALTON &
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 498 (2001)). In addition to

prohibiting the abuser from committing further acts of violence, an order of protection may bar
him from having any contact with the victim whatsoever and may also grant her other remediesincluding possession of the residence or other property, custody, child support, or other
economic relief. See generally Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, ProvidingLegal Protectionfor
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 910-1030
(1993).
265 Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of
Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1192 (2007).
266 See Karfeld, supranote 236, at 1826; Sack, supra note 242.
267 Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 265, at 1193.
268 Id.
269 Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42
FAM. L.Q. 309, 323 (2008).
270 Sharon Cammack & Patrice Pujol, Domestic Violence: A NationalEpidemic, 42 HOUs. LAW.
10 (2004).
271 See Garcia-Rodrigo, supra note 246, at 113.
272 Id.
273 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage,86 VA. L. REV.
1901 (2000).
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financial dependency of wives on their husbands is then believed to be
the "key ingredient of continued power disparity in marriage."274
Because people who "should divorce" often "preserve emotionally
disastrous unions" for economic reasons, 275 many married domestic
abuse victims will not leave their abusers.
As a result of the gendered division of labor roles, women still "fare
more poorly in the employment market and thus are more dependent
on their spouses."276 Simone de Beauvoir, along with her epigones, was a
staunch critic of marriage, maintaining that it was an absurd institution
that oppressed both men and women. 277 De Beauvoir described how
women are particularly burdened by marriage due to the division of
labor:
Few tasks are more like the torture of Sisyphus than housework, with
its endless repetition: the clean becomes soiled, the soiled made
clean, over and over, day after day. The housewife wears herself out
simply marking time: she makes nothing, simply perpetuates the
present. She never senses the conquest of the positive Good, but
rather indefinite struggle against negative Evil.278
According to De Beauvoir, women's work within the home does
not provide her with any autonomy. She is not useful to the wider
society; her work is seen as being mere maintenance. A woman's work is
only given meaning through her husband and children-"she is justified
through them; but in their lives she is only an inessential
intermediary."279 Despite the fact that her obedience is no longer a legal
obligation, this does not change the way that she is perceived in society.
It is very difficult for a woman (wife) to gain recognition for her work,
to be "respected as a complete person." However respected a woman is,
she is still regarded as "subordinate, secondary, parasitic."280
c. Marriage - An Ineffective Means to an End
This Section questions the legitimacy of the values promoted by
marriage as described above. It is debatable whether marriage is actually
an effective means for achieving the government ends described in Part
III.A. 1. Linking the marital status of individuals to the State can be as
harmful as it is helpful. "Obviously, legally sanctioned benefits and
social approval for marriage entails corresponding legal disadvantages

274 Id. at 1937 n.95 (citing STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN'S LIVES 23, 28-30, 132-33
(1998)).
275 Garcia-Rodrigo, supra note 246, at 120.
276 Aloni, supra note 247, at 620.
277 See DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 215, at 504.
278 See id.
279

See id. at 510.

280

See id. at 501.
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and social disapproval for the unmarried."281 In light of the many
critiques of marriage described above, promoting marriage can have an
unfair and unwarranted disadvantage on those who choose not to
marry.
The State's promotion of traditional marriage as a means of
achieving conformity with normative sexual behavior, family stability,
and economic security is problematic for two main reasons. First, the
means-ends relationship is tenuous and often reversed, propelling the
myth that marriage actually helps to achieve any of these goals, when
the government often uses these values to promote the institution of
marriage itself. Second, the means-ends justification assumes that the
government's goals are in fact legitimate.
First, consider the chicken and the egg perspective on the benefits
of marriage. Studies show that "married couples live longer, are
healthier, earn more, have lower rates of substance abuse and mental
illness, are less likely to commit suicide, and report higher levels of
happiness."282 Are these statistics, used to justify the valorization of
marriage, not conceivably linked to the economic and social benefits
ascribed to married couples by the State in the first place? Correlation
here does not necessarily equal causation. By promoting marriage
through economic benefits, the State contributes to the economic
stability and the social acceptance, which may lead to an easier lifestyle
for married couples. Can it be that a typical married couple is happier
than a couple that is in a long term committed relationship that chooses
not to marry? In its promotion of marriage to achieve these goals, the
government perpetuates the paradigm and fails to consider the larger
socio-economic and class factors that play a much more important role
in determining outcomes.
Although the State exalts the virtues of abstinence before marriage,
monogamy, and other sexual behavioral norms, promoting traditional
marriage has little, if any, effect on achieving these government ends.
For example, while the government, in the past, has put significant
resources 283 toward promoting abstinence before marriage, it is unclear
whether such promotion of "normative" behavior as a public health goal

281

Robson, supra note 6, at 778.

282 Id. at 757 n.214.
283 Id. at 797 (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., President's Budget
Increases Abstinence Program Funding (Jan. 31, 2002), available at http://archive.hhs.gov/news/
press/2002pres/20020131a.html, which notes that the President's 2003 budget "pledged to spend
$135 million for abstinence-only education"). In 2000, one commentator noted that in the
previous five years, Congress had increased federal funding for abstinence only sex-education by
three thousand percent. Elizabeth Arndorfer, Absent Abstinence Accountability, 27 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 585 (2000).
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is even realistic.284 Indeed, despite state efforts to promote abstinence
until marriage, "[a] Imost all Americans have sex before marrying."285
Additionally, promoting traditional marriage is only tangentially
related to the goals of building stronger family units or enhancing
economic security. Interestingly, a 1990 U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services report identifying characteristics of strong families
references six studies and forty-nine characteristics before the mention
of "marriage."286 W. Robert Beavers identified that strong families
typically share the following:
1. Connectedness with other social systems, and open to other
viewpoints, lifestyles and perceptions. A respect for differences and
awareness of individual boundaries. Intimacy is attained via skillful
communication. 2. Solid parental coalitions and clear role definition
without rigid stereotyping. 3. Complementary rather than
symmetrical power roles. 4. An encouragement of autonomy. The
family is comfortable with differences of opinion. There is an absence
of invasiveness. The family has a degree of flexibility and
adaptability. 5. The belief that human behavior is limited and finite
and that human behavior is the result of a number of variables, not
one clear-cut cause. 6. Family members are involved with each other.
Conflict may exist between members, but not unresolvable conflict.
7. Effective negotiation and task performance. 8. Transcendent
values. 287

While "economic security"288 can play a role in promoting a
stronger family unit, it is not dispositive. Moreover, economic security is
more closely related with class and socio-economic factors than with
marriage. As Ruthann Robson notes, if the economic consequences of
unwed motherhood were the State's primary concern, government
policy could simply "address the issue by fostering premarital birth
control, including abortion, or perhaps even more radically, economic
support for single parents."289 Instead, the State is using purported social
ends (normative sexual behavior, family stability, and economic
security) to promote its favored choice for the means-traditional
marriage. Robson notes that the government, through abstinence-only
education, utilizes sex itself to promote marriage.290 Similarly, by
284 Lawrence B. Finer, Trends in PremaritalSex in the United States, 1954-2003, 122 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 73, 73 (2007).

285 Id.
286 MARIA KRYSAN ET AL., IDENTIFYING SUCCESSFUL FAMILIES: AN OVERVIEW OF CONSTRUCTS
AND SELECTED

MEASURES 1, 20

(1990), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/idsuc

fam.pdf.
287 Id. at 20 (citing W. ROBERT BEAVERS, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND GROWTH: A FAMILY SYSTEMS

PERSPECTIVE (1977)).
288 Id. (citation omitted).
289 Robson, supra note 6, at 797.
290

Id.

20151

THE CONTRACTUAL FAMILY

1079

subsidizing marriage through the enticement of a bundle of economic
benefits, the State lures couples into marriage, using the ends (economic
stability) to justify and promote the means (marriage). This tautological
justification boils down to the State lauding marriage as a means to
achieving greater economic security, while at the same time exclusively
subsidizing married couples.
d. The Contractual Alternative
Cohabitation agreements allow couples to clarify financial
commitments and regulate their property rights. Not only can
cohabitation agreements provide security in the event of break up, but
also in the event of death or illness, or even when there is no event and
the couple stays together. Through contract, couples can determine in
advance how specific assets will be divided if they separate, and also
specify with great detail how responsibilities will be shared in the
household while they live together and how they will manage their dayto-day finances. These contracts provide a measure of certainty where
the law is silent and a level of specificity to their relationship that is
otherwise impossible to attain from state law. It is unsurprising then
that many feminists support family contracts for their empowerment of
women. 291
The policy arguments opposing contracting in this area are
increasingly less persuasive. The enforcement of contracts between
cohabiting partners has historically been seen as immoral in that the

292
consideration for such agreements was considered to be illicit sex.

This moral hurdle should hardly present an obstacle today, however, in
light of the cultural shifts toward cohabitation before marriage or
without marriage described above. An additional policy concern is for
individuals who do not want to enter contracts that define something as
personal as their intimate relationship or their relationship with their
children. Couples can be uncomfortable discussing financial issues and
obligations. The reality is that couples rarely sign contracts; it costs
money to draw up a contract and contracts can be complicated and
intimidating. Most couples do not sign pre-nuptial agreements, for
example, if for no other reason than they are optimistic about their
relationships. However, this truth should not prevent the enforcement
of contracts otherwise validly entered.
Similarly, potential disparities in bargaining power should not
prevent the enforcement of all cohabitation agreements. It is often the
case that one of the parties to a contract has substantially more
bargaining power over the other party. However, unequal bargaining
Weinrib, supra note 145, at 208-09.
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1449-50 (1992);
see also Weinrib, supra note 145, at 210.
291
292
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power alone, absent a showing of unconscionably one-sided terms,
should not be reason enough not to enforce an agreement. As with all
contracts, cohabitation agreements can be struck down as
unconscionable. But short of unconscionability (or the existence of
some other contract defense), such contracts should be presumed to be
valid. Free-market principles of contract law rely on the premise that
individuals-especially when it comes to intimate matters of family
planning-are and should be freely autonomous to choose the
agreements they wish to enter into.
Based on this real harm from the religious and patriarchal
components of marriage, some couples choose not to marry. These
couples should have the autonomy to define their rights as to each other
without the intervention of the State. When courts fail to enforce
cohabitation agreements, there are two possible effects. First, couples
who do not face legal impediments are in effect faced with "compulsory
matrimony."293 If they want the government benefits and economic
rights that are provided to marital partners through the current legal
regime, as we can presume all rational economic actors do, they must
actually get married. Such "coercive aspects of the phenomenon of
marriage" 294 cannot be overstated. Second, for couples that cannot
legally marry, they are left with unequal access to a variety of economic
benefits.
2.

Co-Parenting Agreements

Twenty-eight million children in the United States are raised in
families in which their caregivers are not exclusively two heterosexual
parents who are biologically related to their children-they may instead
have a single parent, one or both parents may not be biologically related
to them, or they may have multiple primary and non-primary
caregivers. 295 Family law is not meeting the needs of these families.
Therefore, families must often seek to secure parenting rights through
contract.296 The State can regulate to some extent, with the idea that the
293 ROBSON, supra note 10; Robson, supra note 6. Robson argues that matrimony, like
heterosexuality, may not be a "preference at all but something that has had to be imposed,
managed, organized, propagandized, and maintained by force." Robson, supra note 6, at 780
(citing Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD, BREAD, AND
POETRY: SELECTED PROSE 1979-1985, at 50 (1986)).
294 Robson, supra note 6, at 746.
295 Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 91.
296 For some, co-parenting agreements are not necessary in light of the rising prevalence of
second-parent adoptions. Since courts often do not recognize private co-parenting contractsand because parental rights are not automatically conferred to a child's unmarried parentssecond-parent adoptions have become a crucial means of securing parental rights for unmarried
parents. Sam Castic, The Irrationality of a Rational Basis: Denying Benefits to the Children of
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arrangement of second-parent adoptions, for example, is good for most
people. However, there are many family arrangements that do not fit
squarely into state-sanctioned paradigms; the State cannot possibly
legislate all of those individual arrangements.
Private contracts between or among intended parents can fill this
gap and should be enforced as long as the intended parents are fit.
Intention to parent (which may be revealed through contract or through
the initiating role in the conception and birth of a child) can and should
trump genetics in establishing legal parenthood. Contracts between
intended parents should provide even greater evidence of intent to be
bound than biology-indeed, children may be born through natural and
traditional means by accident, where the natural parents did not
"intend" to become parents. But at a minimum, such manifestation of
intent should become equivalent to biology as the ultimate seal of
approval. Thus, contracts that identify the intended parents as the legal
parents should be enforced. If later the intended (legal) parents have a
dispute, the best interest of the child will be considered, as always, to
determine who should have custody.
The California case, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, got this right. In
that case, a heterosexual married couple had a gestational surrogacy
agreement to have a biologically unrelated embryo implanted in another
woman, a surrogate, who would carry and give birth to the child.297
After the fertilization, implantation, and pregnancy, the husband filed
for divorce and asserted there were no children, despite the surrogacy
contract. 298 While the trial court held that neither the husband nor wife
were lawful parents because there was no- genetic connection, the
appellate court reversed, directing the trial court to declare that both
intended parties were indeed the child's lawful parents.2 99 The court
analogized to an artificial insemination statute, providing that an
infertile husband who consents to artificial insemination, though not
genetically related to the child, is still the "lawful father" because he
consented to having the child.300 By consenting to have a child through

Same-Sex Couples, 3 MOD. AM., Summer-Fall 2007, at 3, 6. However, even when the parties are
seeking second-parent adoptions, and courts are willing to grant second-parent adoptions, they
often analyze the same-sex, co-parent-child relationship under a higher level of scrutiny. See
Forman, supra note 108, at 33. Further, second-parent adoptions are not a viable or desirable
solution for all couples-the biological parent might be opposed to giving full parental rights to
the "second parent," and similarly, the "second parent" might not be interested in full parental
rights. For example, a grandparent who seeks visitation rights, without the desire to actually adopt
the child, would be best served by coming to an agreement with the parents for visitation entered
as a consent decree with the court. Contracts allow for more flexible arrangements.
297 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
298
299
300

Id.
Id.
Id. at 282.
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artificial insemination, intent to parent or intent to be the "first cause, or
prime movers, of the procreative relationship" is established.301
Adopting dicta from Johnson v. Calvert-the California Supreme
Court's first surrogacy decision-the Buzzanca court noted that intent
to parent-choosing to bring a child into being-is also the "best rule"
in providing "certainty and stability for the child."302 Despite not
sharing the same genetics, the court in Buzzanca held that like a
husband who consents to artificial insemination, the husband and wife
here were the child's lawful parents because of "their initiating role as
the intended parents in her conception and birth."303 Significantly, the
court did not sugar coat this notion with any best interest of the child
language, which is left for any potential future custody dispute about
between the two intended parents who signed the contract.
In a related scenario, when one of the parties to the contract is a
biological parent of the child and the other is not, the biological parent's
participation in the contract elevates the weight of the agreement even
further as it shows her manifestation of intent to raise the child jointly
with the non-biological parent. The biological parent's very act of
agreeing to the arrangement with the non-biological parent is persuasive
evidence that the court should treat the two parties on equal footing.
Through the execution of the co-parenting agreement, the biological,
legal parent manifests intent to jointly create a family with her partner
and identifies the partner as equal co-parent. This, of course, assumes
that all other safeguards provided by contract law are in place to assure
the assent was real and voluntary and truly manifested through the
agreement.
My proposal works off the premise that, when establishing
relationships and families, non-biological parents deserve the same
certainty regarding the care and custody of their children that biological
parents have. Since it is presumed that legal (biological) parents will act
in the best interests of their children, private co-parenting agreements
between them are encouraged and routinely enforced.304 Once a coparenting agreement identifies the intended (legal) parents (regardless
of their biological relationship to the intended child), the same
presumption should be made, and the contract should also be enforced
as written, as long as both intended parents are fit.
In the sub-sections that follow, I elaborate on my proposal and
address the two expected primary critiques of this position: (1) that

301
302

Id. at 290 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

303

Id. at 293.

304

See infra note 313 and accompanying text.

Id. at 290-91 (citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (holding that in a
gestational surrogacy dispute, she who intended to procreate is the natural mother under
California law)).
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enforcing co-parenting agreements will be at odds with the superior
concern of the best interest of the child; and (2) that enforcing coparenting agreements inappropriately commodifies and devalues
women and children.
a. Co-Parenting Agreements and the Best Interest of the Child
Typically, co-parenting contracts are only considered as one of
many factors in determining the best interests of the child.305 At first
glance, this analysis appears logical and correct-custody should, of
course, be determined based on what is best for the child. This hurdle,
however, is not equally applied to all intended parents. Biological
parents enjoy a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of
their children.306 As long as the biological parents are not deemed
"unfit," they retain rights as to their children, and co-parenting
contracts between them that work out custody arrangements are
encouraged.307 Non-biological parents do not enjoy this same
presumption. In order to gain custody of an intended child, a nonbiological, non-adoptive parent must overcome a more rigorous analysis
of what custody arrangement is in the child's best interest. Indeed, nonbiological, non-adoptive parents have no standing even to file a claim
for custody absent a contract in most states, making contracts
indispensible tools for non-biological intended parents. 308
The most compelling arguments against co-parenting contracts
relate to the requirement that custody decisions be made according to
the best interests of the child. There are abundant concerns about the
child's interests and rights, given that preconception agreements are
made before the child is born and thus the best interests of the child
cannot be considered.309 Logically, a child's interests in receiving
adequate care and love should not be subordinated to a parent's right to
raise her children.310 Some argue that intended parents, however
305 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
306 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
307 See infra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
308 See generally Lawrence Schlam, Third-Party "Standing" and Child Custody Disputes in
Washington: Non-ParentRights-Past,Present, and ...Future?, 43 GONZ. L. REv. 391 (2008); see
also Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 554-58 (Kan. 2013) (holding in part that a parenting
agreement between a same-sex couple was enforceable as long as enforcing it would be in the best
interests of the child). Some states, such as New York, have an "extraordinary circumstances"
basis for gaining standing. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976). The Bennett court held
that "absent surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness or other like extraordinary
circumstances," a biological parent cannot be deprived of custody rights to the child by the state.
Id. at 280. The court added that, "[i] f any of such extraordinary circumstances are present," such
as the birth mother's prolonged separation from her child, the best interest of the child standard
applies to the determination of custody. Id.
309 Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Barteringfor Babies: Are PreconceptionAgreements in the Best
Interests of Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 429,467-68 (2004).
310 Id. at 468.
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complete their agreement, should not be able to determine the status of
children without the imprimatur of the State31l and without a mandated
consideration of the best interests of the child. It may also be argued that
parenting agreements violate states' parenspatriaeauthority by allowing
the parties to such contracts to circumvent this authority.312 A major
critique of contracting in this area is the fear that parties can contract
around state authority, which requires a best interest of the child
analysis before making any custody determinations.
However, enforcing co-parenting agreements does not have to be
at odds with best interest of the child requirements. I advocate the use of
contracts as a means of giving non-biological intended parents the same
status and presumptions as biological parents. Putting non-biological
parents on a similar footing as biological parents does not side-step the
best interests standard. Rather, courts can make custody determinations
in the same manner in which they are made for two biological parents.
Co-parenting agreements between two biological parents tend to
be enforced in most cases because of the presumption that parents know
better than courts what is best for their children and for their families.313
When a man and a woman conceive a child, there is no requirement for
court approval;314 biological parents are presumed to act in accord with
a child's best interest, and the court will interfere with the parents' rights
to raise their children only if there is an allegation or concern that one
parent is not fit.315 In essence, there is a preconception agreement
implied between two biological parents. Supreme Court precedent
requires lower courts to apply the presumption that fit parents act in the

311 Schlam, supra note 308, at 430.
312 Browne-Barbour, supra note 309, at 472.
313 See also Linda Jellum, Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody
Agreements, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 615, 618 (2004) (noting that some states allow for a parental
agreement to be a factor in the best interests of the child analysis while others will presume a
parental agreement made between two biological parents to be in the best interest of the child
unless proven otherwise); see also Robert E. Emery & Kimberly C. Emery, Should Courts or
Parents Make Child-Rearing Decisions?: Married Parents as a Paradigmfor Parents Who Live
Apart, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 365, 379 (2008) (observing that judges often do not overturn
parenting agreements between two biological parents despite the discretion to do so).
314 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that
"[p]arents are not screened for the procreation of their own children; they are screened for the
adoption of other people's children").
315 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (explaining "[w]e have little doubt that the
Due Process Clause would be offended '[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a
natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of
unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest'
(quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)
(Stewart, J., concurring))).

2015]

THE CONTRACTUAL FAMILY

1085

best interests of their children.316 The Supreme Court in Parham has
stated:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.317
Therefore, if a parent "adequately cares for his or her children,"318
"there is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question fit parents' ability to make the
best decisions regarding their children."319
This presumption and belief carries over to situations in which the
two biological parents enter an agreement surrounding custody-coparenting agreements between two biological parents assigning custody
and visitation rights are generally enforceable and encouraged.320
Generally, the State has no interest in interfering in custody agreements
between two fit parents. The assumption is that the "parents have better
information about family functioning than third party decisionmakers
and, in most cases, are more likely than judges to make workable plans
for their post-divorce families."32 Divorcing biological parents are often
encouraged to create parenting agreements for their biological children
as a matter of public policy favoring the "prompt resolution of disputes
concerning the maintenance and care of minor children."322 It is
commonly believed that "most families will benefit if parents avoid
adjudication altogether by making decisions about custody
themselves."323 Indeed, "cooperation and involvement of both parents"

316 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (noting that "there is a presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children" (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979))).
317 Parham,442 U.S. at 602 (citations omitted).
318 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1992)).
319 Id. at 58.
320 See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
321 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling
Persistenceof the Best Interest Standard4 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Grp., Paper No. 13-352, 2013) (citing Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce
Family: Implications of a Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363 (2009)), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2275581.
322 See, e.g., Shoup v. Shoup, 556 S.E.2d 783, 787 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that voluntary,
court-approved agreements promote the policy of "prompt resolution of disputes concerning the
maintenance and care of minor children" and should therefore "be encouraged" (quoting Morris
v. Morris, 219 S.E.2d 864, 867 (Va. 1975))); see also In re Marriage of Coulter & Trinidad, 976
N.E.2d 337, 343 (Ill. 2012) (noting that public policy of encouraging parties to reach agreement
before resorting to litigation is "as strong, if not stronger, in the context of disputes between
divorcing parents as it is in other contexts"); In re Marriage of Kraft, 868 N.E.2d 1181, 1186 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007).
323 Scott & Emery, supra note 321, at 48.
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is believed to lead to greater overall family wellbeing.324 Thus, with an
eye toward enforcing cooperative co-parenting agreements, custody is
still determined based on the best interests of the child, but the best
interest of the child analysis is heavily influenced by the presumption of
custody in favor of the parents and their private agreements.
This same policy and presumption should also be applied to nonbiological parents who prove their parental intent through contract. The
flexible nature of the best interest of the child standard allows for the
same presumptions to be made about all intended parents, regardless of
how a child is conceived. Courts hold considerable discretion325 to apply
the "broad and flexible"326 best interest of the child standard within the
general framework set out by the Supreme Court,327 after consideration
of a wide variety of factors.328 The vagueness of the best interest of the

child standard, and its inherent subjectivity and flexibility, "permit[] the
decision maker the opportunity to render a decision which reflects the
social mores of the day without having to consider values and mores
which have become dated."329 It is this very flexibility that would allow
judges to recognize a presumption that, like biological parents, fit
"intended" parents too act in the best interests of their children.
324 Id. at 50.

325 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 1000 (2013) (noting that "[t]he implementation of the best interest
standard has been left to the sound discretion of the trial judge" (footnote omitted)); see also 14A
Roland F. Chase, "BestInterests of the Child" Standard-Generally,in MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE

SERIES § 8.185 (4th ed. 2013) (explaining that "[tihe trial court has broad discretion in exercising
its determination of the child's best interests" (footnote omitted)); 12 ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, Best
Interests of the Child-FactorsConsidered, in NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES: NEW YORK LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 21:17 (2011) (noting that "there are no absolutes in making the best

interests determination, but rather only policies designed to guide the courts in their
determinations" (footnote omitted)).
326 See, e.g., 3 TIMOTHY TIPPINS, Traditional Standard Best Interest of Child, in NEW YORK
MATRIMONIAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 20.2 (2013).

327 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (affirming the lower court in dismissing

grandparents' visitation petition and holding that the Washington statute as applied to the case
violated the mother's due process right to make decisions about the care, custody, and control of
her daughters, where paternal grandparents were seeking visitation of deceased son's children and
wanted more visitation than the mother desired).
328 In determining the best interests of a child, a court may consider many different factors,
including the quality of a child's interaction with her parents, siblings, and other individuals with
whom the child is close, continuity of care, parenting abilities, parents' employment, health, and
morality, as well as the stability offered by each parents' home environment, and the child's
preference. 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 1000 (2013). In making custody determinations a court may also
look at the age and character of the parties seeking custody, the sex and age of the child, and the
ability of each parent to satisfy the child's educational, emotional, material, and social needs. Id.
(citing Mullis v. Mullis, 994 So. 2d 934 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)). Generally this is a fact-based
approach that requires courts to consider all factors relevant to the child's interests. Id. (citing
Peterson v. Peterson, 281 P.3d 1096 (Idaho 2012)); see also McCormic v. Rider, 27 So. 3d 277 (La.
2010); Julian B. v. Williams, 948 N.Y.S.2d 399 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that the court's primary
responsibility in a child custody determination is to establish, under the totality of the
circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child).
329 SCHEINKMAN, supra note 325.
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Indeed, courts have recognized that parents are generally better
positioned than courts to determine the needs and best outcomes for
their children. Critics of the best interest of the child standard, of which
there are many, bemoan its vagueness and indeterminate outcomes. 330
The standard is known to invite litigation and imposes substantial costs
and burdens on courts and parties. It is argued that "courts are not well
positioned to select and weigh best interest proxies or evaluate the wideranging evidence offered by parties."331 Because the circumstances
surrounding custody disputes are "varied and complex," courts face
"insurmountable obstacles" in sifting through the complexities to render
fair and consistent outcomes. 332 If family members were free to make
custody decisions themselves, there would likely be less hostility
between them and more cooperation. Operating under the presumption
that non-biological intended parents are also best suited to raise their
children would narrow the court's discretion, "obviate[] the need for
psychological evidence" which has proven to be problematic, and bring
"greater determinacy to custody doctrine."333
Such a presumption makes sense in light of society's changing
attitudes regarding families and parenthood. Honoring contracts made
between partners who are not both biologically related to their children
creates parity between biological parents and non-biological intended
parents. With the growing numbers of non-biological families, the law
should protect the rights and interests of intended parents who declare
their intentions through contract. A partnership where one member is
infertile, or where the members are the same sex and cannot reproduce
with each other should not be barred from enjoying the same rights as a
couple where both the woman and man are biologically related to their
child. This is not to say that the second couple deserves superior rights,
but rather that they should not be penalized for their inability to
produce a child who is related to both members.
Such a presumption also makes sense in light of the natural bonds
that form between non-biological parents and the children they raise. It
is somewhat arbitrary to treat biology as the sole or most important
330 See, e.g., Susan Beth Jacobs, Note & Comment, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind "The Best
Interest of the Child" Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 845, 849 (1997)
(arguing that courts set a higher standard for mothers as parents than fathers in a best interests of
the child analysis); Richard A. Warshak, ParentingBy The Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-Child

Standard,JudicialDiscretion,and the American Law Institute's "ApproximationRule", 41 U. BALT.
L. REv. 83, 103 (2011) (critiquing the American Law Institute's approximation rule on the
grounds that it undervalues parents' intangible contributions and is unwieldy and imprecise);

Janet Weinstein, And Never The Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the
Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 79, 109 (1997) (pointing out that very often a judge is
forced to decide custody between two capable parents, leading to unpredictable results).
331 Scott & Emery, supra note 321, at 6-7.
332 Id. at 7.
333 Id. at 3-4.
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determinant of a parent's likelihood of providing a safe and nurturing
home for their child. The fact that a couple cannot produce a child who
is biologically related to both of its members does not of itself make
these parents less fit, nor does it weaken the deep bond between
themselves and the child that they choose to raise. There is nothing
inherently less deserving, from a public policy standpoint, about a
partnership that produces a child who is not biologically related to both
parents. The parents undoubtedly have the same desire for and love of
their child, and the same likelihood of being good parents. As the
Supreme Court has noted, "[n]o one would seriously dispute that a
deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a
child in his or her care may exist even in the absence of blood
relationship."334 In fact, studies have shown that adopted children are
actually more likely to have certain enriching experiences in their
families than the general population.335
b.

Co-Parenting Agreements and the Market

A second argument against the enforcement of co-parenting
agreements relates to its intersection with market values. Public policy
may dictate that co-parenting agreements are an inappropriate and
immoral application of contract law to families as they "devalue human
life," "exploit" and "commodify women and babies," and "devalue[] the
roles of mothers, fathers, children, and families."336 Moral arguments
may be that "all humans [should be treated] as ends in themselves, not
merely as means to other ends" and that gestational services are "so
intimately connected to one's personhood that... [they] should be
protected from the free market."337 Children, according to this
argument, should not be subject to contractual bargaining, given that "a

334 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977); see also In
re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 290 (Ct. App. 1998) (adopting dicta of the
California Supreme Court that "people who 'choose' to bring a child into being are likely to have
the child's best interest at heart" (footnote omitted)).
335 See SHARON VANDIVERE, KARIN MALM & LAURA RADEL, ADOPTION USA: A CHARTBOOK
BASED ON THE 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS (2009), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/NSAP/chartbook/index.pdf. While "love" for adoptive children may
be a somewhat ambiguous measure, the report made several findings regarding the general well
being of adoptive children compared to the general population. These findings concluded that
eighty-five percent of adopted children are in excellent or very good health, and a majority of
adopted children have enriching positive experiences in their families. For example, adopted
children are more likely to be read to everyday as young children (sixty-eight as compared to
forty-eight percent of the general population), sung to or told stories (seventy-three as compared
to fifty-nine percent), and participate in after school activities (eighty-five as compared to eightyone percent). Additionally, eighty-seven percent of adopted parents said they would "definitely"
make the same decision to adopt their child knowing everything they now know about their child.
Id. at 64-72.
336 Browne-Barbour, supra note 309, at 431, 471-72.
337 Id. at 474-75.
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child is a person, and not a sub-person over whom the parent has an
absolute possessory interest."338 These agreements also implicate issues
of race and poverty, because they could lead to difficult choices for
socially and economically marginalized women. 339
Such justifications for not enforcing contracts involving family or
intimate issues tend to be grounded in anti-commodification principles.
Pure commodification (espoused by "Chicago school" legal theorists
Justice Richard Posner and Nobel Laureate Gary Becker) is the belief
that real welfare is always promoted by permitting exchange-so things
like sexuality, love, marriage, health, surrogacy, organs, babies, and the
like can be commodified (i.e., can be made available on open markets
and therefore the subject of contracts).340 The critique (usually a
feminist critique led by Professor Margaret Jane Radin) is that some
things (things with emotional content like the examples listed above)
should not be contractible or commodifiable.341 This critique of
bargaining in general is based on the notion that not everything should
be a quid pro quo.
The commodification theory of human interaction has drawn
criticism in large part because it does not distinguish between that
which is "human" and that which is "not human."342 Professor Radin
explains the distinction as follows: there are certain things that hold
value because they are intrinsic to our self-conception as human beings,
and to commodify them is to undermine the idea of personhood.343
Commodities are typically commensurable (they can be compared and
ranked in value), fungible (they can be substituted one for the other),
and monetizable (they can be sold and converted into dollars); qualities
that certainly do not apply to human beings.344 However, it is not
enough to say that people have a visceral reaction against contracting
for the above-mentioned "contested commodities."345 She centers her
critique upon three separate rhetorical, symbolic aspects of
commodification that are troubling.
The first is the "indicia of commodification."346 This is the
discomfort that arises from using the language of exchange for human
338 Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 31 (N.Y. 1991).

339 Browne-Barbour, supra note 309, at 476.
340 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 156-57 (6th ed. 2003);
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
341 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L.REV. 1849, 1903 (1987).
342 Id. at 1906. See generally Martha M. Ertman, Mapping the New Frontiers of Private
Ordering: Afterword, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 695, 704-05 (2007); Michele Goodwin, The Body Market:
Race Politics& Private Ordering,49 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (2007).
343 Radin, supra note 341, at 1906.
344 MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX,

CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 118-20 (1996).
345 Id.
346 Id.
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commodities, and it is generally worked around by referring to such
exchanges in donative terms. For example, while trade in organs is
illegal, people can "donate" organs or reproductive cells. Similarly, while
surrogacy is illegal in some states, people can serve as surrogates for free.
However, this "incomplete commodification"347 is not actually remedied
by the use of ambiguous language, so we end up with the paradoxical
situation where a woman can "donate" eggs, but other actors down the
line in the transaction unquestionably profit from the sale of the
"donation." Thus, the result of decoupling certain sales and services in
intimate areas from the market is the continued provision of such
services, but without just compensation to the person providing the
valued service. While Radin's anti-commodification argument purports
to value women's bodies and reproductive labor as above market
concerns, in practice, this really leaves women at a disadvantage to both
articulate their individual autonomy, and receive just compensation on
their own terms.

348

Radin's second critique of commodification is the "market
rhetoric"-discussing intimate human relationships or other things that
bear on our humanity in terms of transaction costs, demand curves, and
ownership.349 According to Radin, market rhetoric "transform[s] the
texture of the human world"350 and "turns unique individuals into

fungible entities with monetary values."351 Here, the problem with the
"contractual family" is not necessarily in the actual transactions, but in
thinking about them in depersonalizing, objectifying economic terms.
However, if we shift the conversation about enforcement of such
contracts away from protecting markets to protecting a broader range of
family relationships, we avoid this problem. As pertaining to coparenting agreements, allowing intended parents to contract for custody
rights over their intended children when they otherwise can not have
347 Id. at 102 (coining the term "incomplete commodification" to indicate that some
commodities are monetized, but not entirely).
348 The social stigma of, for example, selling a kidney, has an immeasurable negative impact on
public health, as many people die everyday waiting for a kidney. However, it is illegal to sell a
kidney because of this type of non-commodification argument. The reality is, the noncommodification principle in this case serves no one, especially the people who need kidneys.
Beyond the simple rhetorical application of this non-commodification argument to kidneys, some
would say that we cannot sell our kidneys because of ethical concerns: e.g., poor people would
barter their bodily integrity for a paycheck. But this highly principled argument forgets that poor
people, in fact, compromise their bodies and health in all kinds of ways in dangerous working
conditions in order to survive economically. While Radin's position claims to protect women and
children, it does not actually empower or protect anyone. It boils down to subjective values over
the sanctity of a woman's reproduction-a conservative, not feminist, argument.
349 Radin, supra note 341, at 1859 (explaining that "[b]roadly construed, commodification
includes not only actual buying and selling, but also market rhetoric, the practice of thinking
about interactions as if they were sale transactions ... .
350 Radin, supra note 341, at 1883-87.
351 Jennifer E. Rothman, The InalienableRight of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 218 (2012).
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children naturally (for example, if they are infertile or in a relationship
with a person of the same sex) protects their right to procreative liberty
or their fundamental right as parents in the care, custody, and control of
their children, located in the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process protection. 352 For example, lesbian partners (who do not have
the right to marry in their state) who desire to start a family (wherein
one woman is the biological mother of the couple's child), could use
contract to establish an equitable custody arrangement which would
bypass laws giving custody solely to the biological mother.353 Enforcing
contracts between intended parents honors and gives weight to parties'
intentions, over their biology. Through contract, the couple would have
the option of basing custody on the child's relationship with her parents,
rather than on traditional criteria such as biology, adoption, or
marriage.354 Such a rule and policy creates equality, certainty, and
fairness.
Arguments in favor of enforcement of co-parenting agreements
(such as those made above) have often gotten short shrift because they
focus on the individual interests of parents, whose rights, it is believed,
should not trump the rights of their children. However, with a shifting
of presumptions, as described above, the rights of these two groups do
not have to be at odds. In addition to protecting the constitutional rights
of the intended parents, a persuasive argument can be made from the
point of view of the child-denying children an opportunity to have two
parents, the same as children of a traditional marriage, impinges upon
the children's constitutional rights.355 Without an enforceable coparenting agreement, some non-biological partners of biological parents
may be reluctant to serve as a true parent to a child, fearing that should
the partnership fall apart, they would completely lose their relationship
with the child. It may be difficult for such non-biological parents to
invest in relationships with their children emotionally or financially,
given the uncertainty of the relationship and the unpredictability of the
law in this area. Such agreements arguably advance the public policy of
protecting family relationships even in the absence of blood
relationships.356

352 See Browne-Barbour, supra note 309, at 468 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65

(2000)).
353 Spitko, supra note 141, at 1151-52.
354 Id.

355 See Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third.Parties to Seek Visitation
and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1 (2013).
356 See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
In Smith, the Supreme Court explained that:
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the
society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association, and from the role it plays in "promot(ing) a way of life" through the
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The third aspect of commodification that is troubling to Radin is
"fungibility"-the idea that once a value is ascribed to something, it can
then be valued respective to other things, traded, and is no longer
irreplaceable. She gives the example of children who are sold, whether it
be through what we traditionally think of as impermissible baby-selling
or whether it be through a surrogacy agreement.3 57 According to Radin,
these children may come to see themselves in terms of their monetary
value in the transaction in which they were "purchased," and base their
self-conception against the value that other children would fetch on the
baby-market. Another example would be in the practice of bride price,
where certain monetary or commodity values are ascribed to
marriageable women, and it is clear that brides are not all valued
equally.
Radin's critique is grounded in a cultural feminist perspective,
which values nurturing as a specifically feminine form of understanding
the world (and one that is markedly lacking in the pure
commodification perspective). However, she acknowledges-without
explicitly acknowledging the non-monolithic nature of feminism-that
her perspective is somewhat at odds with liberalism, and by implication
with liberal feminism. That is to say, a perspective that values autonomy
of the individual as a liberty interest, as opposed to merely valuing
freedom of contract, would experience markets as liberating. The ability
to sell commodities gives people who are excluded from the economy
on the basis of sex, race, or class an ability to buy things. For example,
allowing women to contract for sex or reproduction gives them an
opportunity to enter into the market even when they have been denied
the opportunity to cultivate any other skills. The rhetorical argument
against the commodification of family harms a woman's ability to fully
participate in the market economy on her own terms. Notions about a
woman's reproductive and emotional labor in the marketplace and her
home are based on deeply rooted assumptions about women's inability
to articulate the boundaries of her family and the market from herself.
Indeed, though emotional arguments regarding the objectification
and commodification of children and parenthood are to be expected,
they may be overstated in a society that already routinely determines
parental rights and duties through market avenues in the context of
childcare, domestic work, adoption, and ART. In her 2003 article about
re-theorizing commodification, Martha Ertman debunks the common

instruction of children, as well as from the fact of blood relationship.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
357 Radin does not make a distinction between the two, and considers the factor of possible
genetic relatedness between the would-be purchaser and the gestational surrogate to be an
arbitrary distinction used to assuage our discomfort with baby-selling. See RADIN, supra note 344,
at 140.
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belief that parenthood should not be bought and sold.358 She outlines in
detail the ways in which parenthood is already bought and sold:
People routinely exchange funds to obtain parental rights and
obligations through adoption and reproductive technologies. Thus
there is a functioning market. In the case of reproductive
technologies, especially in vitro fertilization and alternative
insemination, this market is a relatively free market, operating as it
does largely unhampered by legal regulation.359
The paradigm of exalting marriage or other sacred institutions of
womanhood and motherhood, as above the market, historically serves
to undermine the market value of gendered work typically performed in
the home, such as home healthcare work or domestic work. The fact is
the market already assigns monetary value to childcare, surrogacy,
housework, adoption, and other gendered labor, and compensates nonfamily members for that work; but when performed by family members,
the monetary value of the work is not only lost, but too taboo to
articulate in a contract. Consequently, the value of "women's work"
becomes illegible and deeply undervalued in the market economy.
Anti-commodification arguments carry less weight in today's
world, as we shall see in the next Part. Accordingly, co-parenting
agreements that accurately represent the intent of the parties to form a
family should be considered over theoretical arguments in support of
non-commodification.
III. EXISTING MODELS FOR ENFORCING FAMILY-BASED CONTRACTS
There is already a contracts regime that co-exists with marriage
and parenting regimes, in which courts routinely enforce contracts in
family relationships. For example, contracts to buy genetic material and
gestational services are routinely enforced, and foster parents regularly
contract with the State to raise children. Similarly, post-adoption
visitation agreements are increasingly enforceable, as open adoptions
have become the norm. In these areas, biology does not supersede the
contract. Further, contracts made prior to marriage and settlement
agreements (contracts in anticipation of divorce) are also enforced
regularly. In these areas, marriage does not supersede the contract.
Generally, premarital agreements made voluntarily between two
consenting adults are presumptively valid and the burden lies with the
party challenging the enforceability of the agreement. Courts employ

358 Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a ParenthoodMarket: A New and Improved Theory
of Commodification,82 N.C. L. REv. 1, 3 (2003).
359 Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
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several factors in analyzing the "voluntariness" of the agreement
including: (1) the relative bargaining power of the parties (including age
and sophistication of the parties); (2) potential coercion based on the
timing and presentation of the agreement (e.g., whether the agreement
was signed shortly before the wedding); (3) whether there was full
disclosure of assets; (4) whether the waiving party had the advice of
independent counsel; and (5) whether the waiving party understood the
terms, purpose, and effect of the agreement. 360 While premarital
agreements are unique contracts given the family law context, the trend
among courts is to treat them just like any other contract, applying the
rules of contract law to analyze whether the agreement is valid and
should be enforced.361 Ironically, prenups are most likely enforced
because they support the State's interest in marriage. Indeed, it is
believed that the marriage oftentimes would not go forward without the
agreement. 362

Post-adoption agreements, in which adopting parent(s) and birth
parent(s) typically agree upon the extent and form of communication
and/or contact that will take place between the adopted-out child and
the birth parent(s) after the adoption decree is final, are also routinely
enforced. Although adoption is "a legal status completely created by
statute,"363 birth parents and adoptive parents are now increasingly able
to use traditional contract law to alter the privileges and obligations
fixed by state statute. Under Section 1-105 of the Uniform Adoption Act
of 1994, a final adoption decree terminates "any previous order for
visitation or communication with an adoptee but leaves to other law of
the State whether agreements for post-adoption visitation or
communication

are

enforceable

in

a separate

civil

action."364

360 In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 824-25 (Cal. 2000).
361 However, premarital agreements signed shortly before the wedding, without the advice of
independent counsel, between two parties with disparate bargaining power, are unlikely to be
enforced, just as any other private contract that is deemed unconscionable would likely be void as
a matter of public policy. See, e.g., Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1115-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976) (holding that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement-including
that the husband sprang the agreement upon the wife and demanded its execution within twentyfour hours of the wedding, passage had been booked for a honeymoon cruise to Europe,
invitations had been given and arrangements for the wedding had been made, and the husband
had insisted on the agreement-together with the agreement's disproportionate terms, supported
a presumption, as a matter of law, of undue influence and overreaching which bore adversely on
the free exercise of the wife's will).
362 Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49
STAN. L. REV. 887, 896 (1997). Recent surveys have demonstrated that prenuptials are becoming
more culturally accepted in the United States, and larger numbers of women are asking for them.
See PrenuptialAgreements Are on the Rise, and More Women Are Requesting Them, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 22, 2013, 8:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/l0/22/prenups--n_414
5551.html.
363 Carol Sanger, Bargaining For Motherhood: Postadoption Visitation Agreements, 41
HOFSTRA L. REv. 309, 315 (2012).
364 UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 1-105 cmt. (1994).
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Consequently, as open adoptions become increasingly more common,
many states have enacted statutes-with various and sometimes unique
requirements-that specifically permit the enforceability of postadoption agreements and guide judicial decisions.365 Statutes that
address post-adoption agreements have gotten positive attention, and
are believed to allow courts to retain their "traditional supervisory role
over the welfare of the child" and honor the preferences-for visitation,
yearly photographs, etc.-of birthparent(s) and adoptive parent(s)366
Some states, such as New Mexico, even have statutes explicitly stating
that post-adoption agreements are presumed to be in the best interest of
the child unless proven otherwise.367
Post-adoption contracts are most likely enforceable because they
are thought to actually foster adoptions, another state interest.368 For
instance, there are many instances in which adoption is in the best
interest of the child but the child's natural parents are hesitant-or
unwilling-to relinquish complete contact with their child. Postadoption agreements foster adoptions in these cases by giving birth
parents the opportunity to retain contact with the adopted-out child
post adoption.369
Finally, contracts for genetic material and gestational services are
widely available to married and unmarried heterosexual couples, samesex couples, as well as single individuals. Since the advent of assisted
reproductive technology in the 1970s and advancements of in vitro
fertilization technology in the mid 1980s, recent years have marked a
shift away from traditional surrogacy (where the surrogate's ovum is
artificially inseminated by a fertile male's sperm, thus the surrogate
shares a genetic relation to the child) to gestational surrogacy
arrangements (where the egg is fertilized in vitro and is then implanted
in the uterus of the surrogate, such that the child is genetically related to
the donor man and Woman and not to the surrogate). The shift to
gestational surrogacy arrangements has, in part, mitigated instances
where a surrogate might renege, which has resulted in a shift in attitude
of many courts toward contracts in these areas.

365 ANN M.

Open Adoption, in HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND
see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-116.01 (2008); CAL. FAM. CODE

HARALAMBIE,

ADOPTION CASES § 14:23;

§ 8616.5 (West 2008); D.C. CODE § 4-361 (2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.305 (West 2007).

366 Sanger, supra note 363, at 323.
367 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35 (West 2008).
368 Sanger, supra note 363, at 315-18.
369

Id.
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CONCLUSION

It is becoming increasingly more apparent that the laws defining
and regulating relationships and family formations are antiquated and
must modernize. Even with federal recognition of marriage equality and
the increasing number of states that allow same-sex marriage, many
people still choose not to marry. However, there remains a presumption
that marriage is a prerequisite to many legal protections. Similarly,
despite the advent and popularity of ART, there remains a presumption
that biology is a prerequisite to many legal protections regarding
parenting. With these continuing presumptions, the ever-growing
number of families and couples not fitting the traditional mold are
forced to search other areas of the law, such as contract law, for legal
protections. By utilizing contract law, modern families can achieve some
of the protections that are currently awarded to "traditional" families by
law upon marriage and from biology. But even where the opportunity
for contract protection exists, non-married couples trying to contract
for legally recognized relationships, and parents who are not biologically
related to their children (and who have not adopted them) yet try to
contract for custody rights, are often faced with tests of their intentions,
credentials, and fitness that their traditional counterparts need not
endure.
The dialogue about the rights of non-marital couples often focuses
on same-sex unions, assuming that heterosexual, non-married couples
could just get married and enjoy the benefits. With the recent DOMA
decision, the concerns of non-married couples might be diminished
further. This presumption undermines the coercive nature of requiring
marriage as a means of receiving state and federal economic benefits
and protections. As discussed, many couples choose not to marry, or
desire to order their affairs in ways that deviate from state norms.
Similarly, the dialogue about parenting continues to assume that the
best interest of the child is in conflict with the rights of non-traditional
parents, when data do not bear that out. This presumption can have
harmful results to both the intended parents and their intended
children.
I do not favor contracting over other legal protections such as, for
example, tax reforms that benefit married and single people equally.
These certainly are not mutually exclusive movements to redefining
family. Indeed, there are many evolving laws and regulations that
successfully capture the needs of non-traditional families. For example,
recently, the New York City housing authority has allowed shelter
residents to define their own gender, as well as define their own family.
This means that people can choose whether they want to go into men's
or women's residences, and if they have children, residents can choose
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who they want to bring into family housing, including non-conjugal
partners and co-parents. While far from perfect in its execution, this
type of administrative policy is actively dismantling the state-sanctioned
privileges assigned to biology and marriage.
Similarly, I do not see contract law as simply a temporary way of
addressing the shortcomings of family law or other areas of the law. Of
course family law could simply be reformed to reflect some of what I
would like to see contracts achieve, such as creating a legal presumption
that puts intended parents on equal footing with biological parents. But
ultimately contracts will always be able to do what state regulation can
not, which is define the exact contours of a private relationship in the
way that the individuals involved desire.
Autonomy and privacy are core principles of the American legal
system and are especially important in matters of intimacy. People in
non-traditional intimate relationships and people who are raising
children not biologically related to them should not have to jeopardize
their self-determinacy and privacy in order to arrange their personal
economic lives efficiently.
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